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The Ukrainian peasant Nestor Ivanovich Makhno is usually given an abbreviated
historical mention as the leader of the rowdy Anarchist "Blacks" during the Ukrainian
and Russian civil wars and beyond, from 1917 through 1921. Yet his leadership of the
Revolutionary Insurgent Army, maliciously labeled a "Bandit Army" by all the
combatants it opposed, was In fact a regionally based and broadly supported peasant
coalition that vigorously resisted foreign domination. From Makhno and his followers'
perspective, the interests of the Ukrainian peasantry directly collided with those of
Austro-Gennan imperialism, Ukrainian nationalism, and Tsarist and Bolshevik
absolutism alike.
During the bloody and-contracted Russian and Ukrainian civil wars the armies of
all the protagonists could obtain superficial signs of civilian support in the towns through
which they passed because of their weaponry. But, Makhno alone achieved genuine and
sustained support from the Ukrainian peasantry, wbo were attracted to his libertarian
leanings. Makhno advocated the re-establishment oflocal political autonomy and
traditional Ukrainian homestead farming and he bad an idyllic vision of autonomous rural
anarchistic communities. These goals stood in stark contrast to the imperial domination
favored by the Austro-Hungarians, the empowered bureaucracy promoted by Simeon
Petliura's Ukrainian nationalists, the re-establishment ofTsarist gentry hegemony
advocated by the Whites, and the dictatorship of the proletariat championed by the Reds.
Because these groups all ignored the Ukrainian peasantry's political desires, Makhno
found abundant support for his anarchist agenda in the fertile Ukraine.
While Makhno's theoretical commitment to anarchism and his utopian vision
remained fixed, the flu.id political and military environment in which he lived forced
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Makhno into a variety of unlikely alliances. Initially, for example, Makhno allied with
the Bolsheviks to defeat their common White and oationalist enemies. Subsequently,
when Red aggression in the region was combined with the imposition of War
Communism and state farms, Makhno fought against the Bolsheviks. At different times,
both the Reds and the Whites issued death warrants against him.
Makhno's complex and ambiguous pro-peasant anarchist orientation also resulted

in temporary affiliation with anti-Semitic forces, incidents of brazen banditry, and acts of
unexp~led charity.

Makhno's personal story, like that of the movement he led, thus bear

supreme testimony (0 the turbulence of the day, a time when, depending on one's
ideological vision of the future, an idealistic yet militant peasant partisan could be viewed
as either a hero or a villain.
Yet, a firmly established archetype for rebel leaders increased Makhno's
popularity amongst the Ukrainian populace. The peasantry bad long told mythical tales
and sung songs about the bravery, martyrdom, and supernatural abilities of popular revolt
leaders of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Because these charismatic rebel
leaders, such as Stenka Razin and Emelian Pugachev, had fought for the rights of the
serfs and against the advances of the centralized state into the Greater Russian periphery,
the peasantry continued to extoll their virtues, while disregarding their shortcomings. As
adverse situations persisted, these heroic rebels of the past took on the supernatural
capabilities of a messiah; they could not be held by bars and were immune to bullets. At
some time in the future, they might return from hiding to save the peasantry once again.
Although Makhno never equated himself dir~tly with either Pugachev or Razin, the
peasantry's collective memory of these rebel leaders, combined with their persisting
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traditional grievances, led many to associate Makhno and his forces with these earlier
peasant rebellions.
Makhoo's resulting broad base of support among the Ukrainian peasantry
strengthened as well as limited his movement. For example, extensive peasant support
allowed him to expedite his military maneuvers with a steady supply of fresh horses from
noncombatant supporters. Peasant support also facilitated his very successful guerrilla
tactics, in which his peasant soldiers would strike a target and then bury their weapons
and resume their normal agricultural lifestyle. At the same lime, however, the peasant
identity of Makhno's followers limited his movement's potential. For instance, his
peasant supporters would'not sanction supplying the hungry cities with food, which
precluded the possibility of gathering a large urban following, which, in tum, aided
Bolshevik domination of these strategic centers. Moreover, the peasantry's general
aversion to urbanites, lofty ideology, and further self-sacrifice, persisted along the lines
of more traditional manifestations like those of preceding rural revolt leaders like Stenka
Razin and Emelian Pugachev. His reliance on peasant support thus forced Makhno, like
all radical utopian theorists who try to actualize their visions and defend their
communities, to depart from some of their idyllic desires in order to facilitate greater
solidarity.
The aims and ideas of the international anarchist community, which Makhno
encouraged, protected, and espoused, differed in fundamental respects from the
temporary manifestations of "anarchy" that both Makhno and his Black supporters
deemed practical and necessary. In fact, the eventual transfonnation of Makhno's
anarchist forces into a popularly supported regional military government that defended
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local political and economic autonomy actually contradicted the purest tenets of
theoretical anarchism. Put simply, Makhno and his followers found that in order to
defend and preserve their movement they had to deviate from anarchist ideals.
The ambiguous character of the Makhnovist movement thus raised in stark form
perennial questions about the real life possibilities of anarchism and utopian social
theories in general. Is it even possible for an independent, truly pure anarchisticcommunity to exist on this earth? What happens to utopian ideas when people try to put
.,

them into practice? Will theorists always find fault with practical attempts to put
anarchist theory into practice? Anarchists ofMakhno's day recognized the importance of
his experiment for their movement, but they differed widely in their opinions of it. As
Michael Palij explains,
Some regarded it as [an] expression of anarchism and believed
that the anarchists should devote all their energies to it. Others
held that the povs/an/si represented the native rebellious spirit
of the southern peasants, but that their movement was not
anarchism, though anarchistically tinged ....Several [others] took
an entirely different position, denying to the Makhno movement
any anarchistic meaning whatsoever. 1
This study argues that Makhno served as the voice of the otherwise silent and
repressed Uiaainian peasantry at the same time that be strove to implement an
interpretation of anarchism which catered to the peasantry's desires. The governmental
organizatio~ military

structure and arbitrary tendencies afhis movement obviously

compromised the libertarian ideas espoused by the international anarchist community.
They were, however, in full accord with the peasantry's conception of the valiant revolt
leader, an archetype that was deeply imprinted in the peasantry's collective consciousness

1 Michael Palij, The Anarchism of Nestoc Makhno, 191 g - 1921 (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1976),58.
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and which was best exemplified by the rebel leaders Stenka Razin and Emelian
Pugachev.
Within this revolutionary tradition, Makhno, like the plethora of political and
social theorists both before and after him, was forced to sunnount the difficulties of
implementing his theories in an "impure" human environment by modifying them within
a temporary manifestation. While these compromises served as fodder for endless
disputes between Makhno and the theoretical anarchists of his day, they were not
important to Makhno's peasant supporters. For the average Ukrainian peasant, anarchism
was merely a path to the alleviation of a plethora of grievances that had persisted for
centuries. While Makhno and his fellow anarchs 2 earnestly hoped to achieve true
theoretical anarchy in the future, the Ukrainian peasantry saw their support ofMakhno's
ideologically-benevolent movement as a means of facilitating their immediate economic
and political emancipation. The peasantry's traditional desire for land and autonomy
drew them to Maklmo's banner because he protected their interests, left a great deal of
autonomy in their hands, and produced the results which the peasantry desperately
desired. Because it sought to establish a theoretically pure anarchist society, the
Makhnovist movement subordinated its theoretical aspirations, of necessity, to those of
the peasantry. The fact that Makbno defended the peasants' agenda while simultaneously
retaining his noble ideals amplifies the importance of the Mahknovist experiment.
Because the Ukrainian peasantry accepted voluntarily supported governmental
and military structures to facilitate libertarian gains, the Blacks relied heavily upon the
thoughts of Michael Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin, who advocated these mamfestations

2 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, an "anarch" is a noun meaning a leader or advocate
of revolt or anarchy.
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within revolutionary anarcho-communism. The result of this symbiotic relationship
between traditional peasant aspirations, anarchist guidance, and revolutionary anarcho
communist thought was remarkable: through their well orchestrated resistance, the
''Black'' Makhnovist forces provided one of the few occasions in history when self
professed anarchists

cont~olled a

significant amount of territory for an extended period of

time.
The remarkable success of Makbno' s partisan forces, like that of other insurgent
groups, necessitated their removal by the emerging Bolshevik state. Because Makbno's
Black forces effectively hindered and threatened Bolshevik ascendancy in the Ukraine,
the peasantry's assimilation into the new state could only occur after support for Makhno
had been undermined and the example of his erstwhile anarchistic community had been
eliminated. The Makhnovist movement had proven itself a fearful adversary for
Bolshevik centralization precisely because it had effectively combined the peasantry's
traditional aspirations and a widely accepted charismatic leader with an adaptable
interpretation of revolutionary Anarcho-Communism.

The Ukraine Under Tsarist Rule and Beyond
The Ukraine was only sparsely populated until Catherine the Great (1763-1796)
annexed the last non-Russian section from the Turks in 1787 and renamed it ''New
Russia." In an attempt to populate the region, Catherine had introduced a policy of
foreign colonization that was continued by her successor, Paul (1796-1801). The Tsarist
government issued its two earliest manifestos on December 4, 1762 and June 22, 1763,

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 9th ed., s.v. "anarch."
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approximately 25 years before the entire Ukraine was annexed. In these documents
foreign settlers were guaranteed liberal terms and "the Monarchical favor." As a result,
large numbers of Russian, Annenian, Bulgarian, Georgian, Greek, Italian, Jewish,
Moldavian, Wallacruan, Serb and German foreigners settled in New Russia. During her
reign, Catherine gave the seventy-five thousand foreigners that settled in New Russia a
total of four million acres and loans totaling six million roubles -- two million roubles of
which was an outright gift. 3
The German Mennonites were given the most generous grants and privileges. As
conscientious objectors to war, the Mennonites were free from all military obligations.
As preferred citizens, they were exempted from all taxation for thirty years, and given a
complete monopoly over all breweries and distilleries. The tsarist govenunent also
financed the construction of their villages, and each family was given sixty-five
dessiatina (a little over 175 acres) on the richest soil, along with a loan of five hundred

rubles. Each German Mennonite village was also granted a large free pasture and a
forest, along with the right to establish their own social, economic, educational, and
political organizations.
Most Ukrainian peasants viewed the foreigners' privileged status with disgust,
for, New Russia, along with the Caucasus, was the last region of the Russian Empire to
be enserfed, in 1796. While Ukrainian nobles, a small number of artisans, and some
peripheral peasants remained free, the majority of tIle Ukrainian peasantry were pushed
into noncompensated forced labor. Although the Mennonites established separate
colonies, and remained aloof of the Ukrainian serfs, some newcomers -- particularly more

J Malec, The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 1918-1921: an Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution
(London: London School of Economics and PoliticaJ Science, 1982), xviii.
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wealthy Russian and Polish immigrants -- became gentry serf owners. The Ukrainian
peasants were being enserfed, while groups like the German Mennonite settlers were
benefiting immensely through separate autonomy and special privileges. 4 The serfs
naturally resented this disparity.
As a result of the influx of privileged foreigners, the commercial production of
I

landlords in New Russia increased dramatically. Alongside the fertility of the Ukraine,
this fact can be explained by the character of serfdom in this region. While only fortyone percent of the serfs in the central industrial regions fulfiUed their obligations to their
master by noncoropensated field work(barshchina), 99.9 percent of the recently enserfed
peasants of New Russia were on barshchina. Because the New Russia had rich soil
which was well suited for wheat production, landlords made more money by retaining the
agricultural product of their land than by requiring their serfs to pay obrok (obligations
paid in cash or kind.., instead of compulsory labor).5
When Tsar Alexander II (1855-1881) abolished serfdom in 1861, the Ukrainian
peasants felt that their "liberation" was incomplete. OnJy a little land left the landlord's
hands, and that which was transferred to the peasantry was sold to them at an inflated
price. Household servants and the serfs of small landowners were simply emancipated
without any land. Moreover, the ex-serfs remained under state supervision, were tied to
the land by a system of collective redemption for the land they had received, and were
not allowed to attend secondary schools. The Ukrainian peasants therefore increasingly
deserted their communal holdings for the rapidly disappearing frontier of New Russia. 6

In time, the situation of the Ukrainian peasantry deteriorated further, and they

4

5

Palij, 47-49.
Malet, xviii.
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began to protest their situation. Beginning in the 1880s, the peasant population of the
Ukraine increased dramatically, and as a result per capita land allotments decreased
accordingly. In fact, between 1880 and 1900, the average land allotment dwindled from
3.6 to 2.3 dessiatina. Because the Gentry owners continued to have a good return on their
agricultural holdings, they were reluctant to rent their pastures out to the needy peasantry.
The results were forthcoming. During the 1890's Katerynoslav province alone
experienced 88 uprisings involving 188 villages.? Towards the end of the century, the
peasant movement against the landlords became more radical and was led by the Socialist
Revolutionary Party, which tried to refocus peasant grievances on political issues. In
1902, it was the issue ofland reform that resulted in 160 riots in Ukrainian villages. And
again in 1905, in the context of a nationwide revolution, there were riots protesting the
agrarian situation in all eight provinces of the Ukraine.
Following the Revolution of 1905, Prime Minister Stolypin attempted to solve
Russia's land problem by creating a prosperous and therefore conservative peasant strata.
His 1911 Land Settlement Act abolished communal tenure, enclosed scattered strips
within concentrated land holdings, and established individual peasant farmers on their
own allotments. But because poorer peasants lacked sufficient farm equipment and other
resources, the Stolypin reforms provided them with no relief. Instead, they were often
forced to sell their land. This outcome, in fact had been Stolypin's goal all along; he
explained to the Third Duma, that "the government bad placed its wager not in the needy,
but on the strong -- the sturdy individual proprietor."
4

As a result of Sto typin' s policy, the agrarian dilemma in the Ukraine only

6

7

Palij, 49.
Palij, 49-50.
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worsened in the years between the 1905 and 1917 Revolutions. 8 Indeed, the observation
of the Marshal of the Nobility of Katerynoslav province was as true in 1917 as it had
been when he made it in 1883:
The peasants firmly declared that they would take the land
they considered to be theirs away from the landlords. They
reasoned that even if the land was appropriated to the landlords
in the past, this was unjust because it [the land] was acquired by
the blood of their parents and their peasant ancestors. 9
The conditions in which the average peasant lived after the fall of the Romanov
dynasty continued to breed dissatisfaction. By 1917, forty percent of the Russian
peasantry could not subsist on only the land they owned, an equal portion could barely
survive if weather conditions were good; and only twenty percent were secure. Almost
all of the peasantry desired. more land, whether it would be given them directly, or
distributed amongst their communes. 10 With the dawn of World War [, peasant
unhappiness was only exasperated further. Pressed by the demands of war, taxes
increased dramatically. Simultaneously, peasants experienced high rates of conscription
into an anny that was being decimated in World War I.
Although the Ukraine bad abundant military potential, and strong traditions that
could have supported a nationalistic agenda, the country remained politically and
nationally underdeveloped. The fact that the peasants believed their unhappy
circumstances resulted from the actions of the state and its supporters only perpetuated
this situation. They were quite conscious of their previous political and economic
manipulation by the state, the gentry, and outsiders in general. As a result, they opposed
urbanites, central bureaucracies, and foreign domination in all of its many minifestations.

g

9

Palij, 50-51.
Quoted in Palij, 50.
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Essentially self-interested, their opposition to the Ukrainian Nationalist,
Hetrnanite puppet, Russian Tsarist, and Russian communist governments was based upon
the desire for private ownership of land, individual liberty, and freedom from "foreign"
exploitation. Since no fonn of government had ever attempted to satisfy their deepest
desires, the Gulyai Polye populace was receptive to the radical idea that the state in every
form was evil and should be combated. The Ukrainian peasantry therefore came to
oppose all forms of national government at the same time that they embraced revolution
as a means to achieve genuine liberation.

In contrast to lhe oppression visited upon them by the state was the Cossack
tradition of social and political rebellion and a persistent vision of freedom. Ukrainian
peasants, especially in the region of Gulyai Polye, focused their attention on the issues of
land ownership and human rights which had persisted since the Ukraine's annexation.
The Gulyai Polye populace sought leadership from partisan leaders who were not
affiliated with any of the many competing official governments, and especially from
those who directly opposed government. Their conceptualization of the revolutionary
spirit and the rebel leader was based on their collective memory of the 17th and 18th
century peasant rebels Stenka Razin and Emelian Pugachev who actively resisted
domination and exploitation by the tsarist government and the gentry landlords. The
memory of these two courageous rebel leaders served both as an example and a call to
anus for the oppressed peasantry.

10

Malet, 117.
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Historical Predecessors in the Peasantry's Struggle for Autonomy
The 1670 - 1671 rebellion under Stenka Razin was the ftrst great popular peasant
uprising against the Russian Tsanst state. As a Don Cossack, and thus a descendent of
fugitives from Muscovite oppression, Razin's grievances against the state were clear.
The Don Cossacks had long valued local autonomy, personal independence, and social
equality amongst its members. These ideals, coupled with the Don Cossacks' "republic,"
naturally positioned them as a challenge to absolutist Romanov rule. The Don Cossacks
refused to recognize any authority but that of their krug, or general assembly. I J
The Cossacks had long had special agreements with the Tsarist government that
provided them with significant autonomy in exchange for guarding Russia's Southern
frontier. They valued their historic independence to such an extreme that they would not
allow farming, which in Russia proper was tied to the institution of serfdom. The
Cossacks rejected serfdom and farming because they believed that the presence of the
Russian nobility would inevitably lead to greater centralized control, resulting in a loss of
the personal freedom enjoyed by the Cossack communities. In essence, the Cossacks
declared that they would guard Muscovy's borders for "the waters and grasses, but not
for estates."12
The reign of Tsar Alexis was an especially difficult time for the Russian peasantry
and it witnessed a major revolt by the Don Cossack Stenka Razin and a band of
followers. Because the Don Cossacks maintained the basic principle that "From the Don
no one is handed over," the Don region had always been a sanctuary to which serfs could

11

Paul A vrich, Russian Rebels 1600 - 1800 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1976), 51-52, 59

62.
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escape in order to circumvent their obligations. With the advent of the Law Code of
1649, commoners were bound to their geographic locale and obliged to take up the
hereditary occupation and status of their parents. A war with Polan~ which began in
1654, increased the economic and human demands on the peasantry, thereby causing a
deterioration in the serfs' condition. As tax levies and military mobilizations increased,
floods of serf refuges poured into the Don. 13 The overall situation of the Russian
commoners during Tsar Alexis' rule was perhaps most poignantly described by a Dutch
visitor who witnessed a group of commoners petitioning Tsar AJexjs. They spoke to him
concerning the intolerable great taxes and contributions, whereby
they were overburdened for some years... 50 they with their
wives and children are thereby ruined; besides which the great
oppressions which the boyars did lay daily upon them, and that
tbey were not able to hold out any longer. Yea., they desired rather
with their wives and children to undergo a present death than to
14
suffer any longer in such a transcendent oppression.

Alongside these difficulties, the official Orthodox Christian Church also
experienced a crisis. Religious dissenters, known as "Old Believers" because they
resisted the reforms ofPatriarcb Nikon, viewed both the Patriarch and Tsar Alexis as the
Beast of the Apocalypse. While most Russians still identified Tsar Alexis as the
traditional "good tsar," they were increasingly coming to believe that he had been
deceived by the wicked boyars into oppressing the people for the exclusive benefit of the
nobility. Over time, however, a good portion of the non-religious dissenting Russian
populace began to see an element of the devil in Tsar Alexis. ls
By the time ofRazin's 1670 rebellion, the Don,s population had reacped 25,000 -

Il

13
1.1

quoted in Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels, 61.
Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels 1600 - 1800, 52,59-62.
Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels 1600 - 1800,57.

Young 15

- a full three times the level it had been before Alexis ascended the thrown. As they had
before, the subjugated Russian populace, holding a variety of grievances, sought relief on
tbe periphery of the Russian Empire, under the protectlon of the Cossack hosts. This
dramatic population increase strained the resources of the Don and provided a powerful
reason for the state to infiltrate the Don on the bebalf of the distressed gentry serf holders,
who were the bread and butter of the Rornanov's administrative structure.
Following the precedent set by Ivan the Terrible, he sought to increase his control
over provincial administration and the military. He eliminated the traditional boyar
(aristocratic) council and the Zemski Sobor (Council of the Land) and replaced them with
a national assembly chosen by himself. Simultaneously tbe Cossacks' local autonomy
was diminished as the authority of the centrally appointed voevoda was increased
markedly.16 The convergence of political, socia-economic, and religious grievances
during Alexis' rule provided the perfect environment for a rebellion led by a charismatic
leader. It seems only appropriate tbat the Russian people's protest was heard through the
actions of the Don Cossack Stenka Razin. 17 Razin's aim was straightforward: he would
replace the new bureaucratic autocracy with decentralized, Cossack-style assemblies and
elected officials. IS
While Razin and his followers certainly engaged in freebooting and piracy, the
movement never departed from its central aim: the complete liberation of the common
Russian serf. In pursuit of this objective, a flotilla ofRazin's forces had journeyed along
the Caspian Sea to Persia, and even sai led up the lower and middle Volga in early 1670.
Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels 1600 - 1800, 51-52, 59-62.
Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels 1600 - 1800, 51-52, 59-62.
17 John Channon and Rob Hudson, 45,50.; Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels 1600 - 1800,51-52,59

1.1

16

62.
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Throughout these journeys, his forces took special efforts to massacre tsarist officials and
landlords while proclaiming the liberation of all the oppressed. 19
Stenka Razin's response to the widespread Cossack and peasant grievances of the
late 17th century emerged from a long tradition of Cossack militancy in defense of their
own autonomy and in support of the liberation of the Russian people. Because these
values were commonly held throughout the Don, Razin's movement grew exponentially.
Yet, as Nikolai Kostomarov observed, Stenka Razin's charisma and personal example
also contributed to his movement's success. Nikolai Kostomarov observed something
extraordinary in Razin's personality. He had
enormous will and impulsive activity... now stem and gloomy,
now working himself into a fury, now given up to drunken
carousing, now ready to suffer any hardship with superhuman
endurance. There was something fascinating in his speech;
reckless courage was written in his coarse and slightly pock
marked. features. The crowd sensed some supernatural
strength in him, against which it was useless to struggle. They
called rum a sorcerer... 20

Such charisma., coupled with the aims of Razin's movement, caused fugitive serfs,
religious dissenters, and libertarian desiring partisans to join Razin's movement in
droves. Even after government forces defeated him at Simbirsk in 1670, Razin's
charisma and the popularity ofms cause allowed him to hold out for almost a year at his
home base in Astrakhan. When Astrakan finally fell in 1671, Razin was captured and
shipped to Moscow where he was executed, an act that enshrined him as a popular martyr
for his cause. 21

Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels 1600 - 1800, 117.
Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels 1600 - 1800 , 50-131.
20 Ibid., 69.
2\ John Cbannon and Rob Hudson., 45, 50.
IS

19
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After his death, Razin's name was incorporated into a plethora of folk legends and
songs as the deliverer who tried to gain freedom and justice for the Russian serfs. In his
day, Pushkin was fond of referring to Razin as "the one poetic figure in Russian history."
One authority even asserts that Razin was the subject of more songs and legends than any
other popular hero.

22

Following his death, Razin took on supernatural powers in these

folk legends.
[BJullets could not harm him, be could cast a spell over snakes,
open locks by magic, and escape from prison by drawing a
boat on the wall with charcoal or chalk and sailing away.23
The legends gradually gave way to a belief in Razin's immortality: he had not
died, but was hiding in a distant location, waiting for the proper time to return and
liberate the Russian people. Some of the folk legends and songs took a different
approach, voicing the notion that Razin had a son who would return to realize his father's
aims. Later, during Pugachev's rebellion, this concept of a succession of saviors passed
onto him. As Nikolai Kostomarov recounts, as late as the 1840's, he regularly met old
peasants in the Volga region who believed that Pugachev bad been the "second coming of

Razin after a hundred years.,,24 A legacy had been established. 25

Pugachev's persistence within the peasantry's collective memory
During Catherine the Great's rule Tsarist injustices against the peasantry
produced a major peasant rebellion. A variety of social, political, religious, and
economic peasant grievances once again provided an opportunity for rebellion. Although

Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels 1600 - 1800, 120.
Ibid., 121.
204 Ibid.. 122.
15

John Channan and Rob Hudson, 45, 50.
22

23
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some peasants within the patriarchal peasant communities deemed Catherine an
illegitimate sovereign because she was female, this was ooJy a minor aspect of the
difficulties that would peak between 1773 and 1774. The peasantry's rejection of
Catherine centered on the fact that she had come to power by murdering of her husband,
Peter ill, in 1762. 26 Prior to his death, on February 18, 1762 Peter had issued a manifesto
freeing the nobles from compulsory service. Immediately following this proclamation,
Peter converted. Russia's ecclesiastic serfs into state peasants. Most serfs saw this
emancipation as the flISt stage of a general emancipation. Upon murdering Tsar Peter 1 ,
Catherine and the gentry brought a cessation to this evolution. Upon gaining the throne
Catherine immediately converted the newly created state peasants back into monastic
serfs. For many peasants, Peter's murder at the hands of ills wife and her aristocratic
supporters seemed in line with the popular myth of the good tsar who martyred himself
for his people. As early as 1762, tbe year of Peter's death, rumors began circulating
widely ofPeler's resurrection and future return. 27
But the policies of Catherine's government also augmented peasant resentment.

In 1767 she published a new code of laws that prohibited serfs from petitioning the crovm
against their masters on punishment of the knout and forced labor for life in Siberia.
Between 1762 and 1772, Russia's war with Turkey increasingly burdened the Russian
serfs with taxes and recruitment. Hordes of runaway serfs once again sought safety in the
Southern borderlands?8
Objections to the Tsarist government's attempts at central domination once again
originated in the southern frontier, amongst the Yaik Cossacks in 1773. In return for

26

27

John Channan and Rob Hudson, 48,52.
Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels 1600-1800, 183-185.
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their service to the crown as southern border guards, Tsar Michael (l613-1645)had
promised the Yaik Cossacks full possession of the Yaik river and the area surrounding it.
But by the 18th century, the region was increasingly being settled by runaway serfs. To
make matters worse, in 1735 the Tsarist government began forcing the Yaik Cossacks to
lease their rights to the Yail< river for a large annual sum. Tensions rose to a boil in 1765
when the Russian War College was given control over the region. Conscripts from the
local populace were taken by force. As Old Believers and Cossacks, these commoners
were profoundly offended both by their status as regular peasant soldiers and by the
requirement that they, like all recruits, shave their beards. As Old Believers, the Yaile
Cossacks prized their beards "almost equal to their lives.,,29 Nativist elements were
rejecting foreign innovations and the modernization of the Russian Ii fe and state. The
expanding tsarist center was once again pitted against the rapidly disappearing frontier.
Pugachev claimed that he was the "true tsar" Peter ill, who had returned as the
"protector of the people." This claim positioned him as a leader to which groups with a
variety of social grievances could flock. His goals were diverse and the grievances he
voiced were profound: the Yaile Cossacks should retain their traditional hunting and
fishing liberties; serfs should be freed; the Bashkirs (an indigenous people) should be
given complete autonomy; and the grievances of the Old Believers should be redressed.
As a disgruntled Cossack, an Old Believer sympathizer, a fugitive from the law, and a
military deserter, Pugachev identified with the sympathies of his region. 3D In his pursuit

of the interests of the peasantry, Emelian Pugachev positioned his rebellion in opposition
to gentry domination in its manifestations as landlord, recruiter, and a centralizing
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bureaucracy.) I
Following in Razin's footsteps, Pugachev viewed the democracy of the Cossacks
as the path for achieving these aims. Forced labor and serfdom would be abolished and
each strata of Russian society would be freed from obligations to all but the tsar.
Pugachev's proposals envisioned a dramatically different society -- one in which only the
'legitimate' tsar could demand the service of the populace. 32
Pugachev's rebellion was geared toward propagation. Social and religious myths,
which were carefully nurtured through propaganda, connecting Pugachev to Razin or the
"true tsar" Peter III bolstered Pugachev's following. Because Pugachev's grievances and
goals were almost universally held, his cause drew a large and diverse following. While
the majority of his recruits were peasants or lesser Cossacks, his movement rapidly grew
to include artisans and traders from the towns, peasants, lower clergy, Urals foundry
workers, Volga boatmen, mountain tribesmen, and religious dissenters?)
The Pugachev rebellion resulted in a series of rebellions throughout the Volga and
Urals regions in 1773 and 1774, and in the winter of 1773-1774 Pugachev captured
Kazan and even threatened MoSCOW.
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Pugachev's forces were internally divided and

this flaw undermined their overall success. His forces were uncoordinated and they
wasted a great deal of energy on pillage and destruction. Moreover, they remained on the
periphery rather than attacking the center of the Russian Empire. Coupled with these
strategic problems, the religious and national divisions within Pugachev's movement
finally led to its demise in 1774. Betrayed by a frightened faction within his forces,
John Channon and Rob Hudson, 48.
Ibid., 47-48.
32 Ibid., 48.
3llbid., 47-48,52.
3Q
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Pugachev was captured by tsarist forces, taken to Moscow, and executed. 35 Without his
leadership, the rebel forces quickly splintered, making their annihilation by Catherine's
forces that much easier. 36
Following Pugachev's execution, peasant myths grew up about him, just as they
had earlier about Razin. Rumors circulated amongst the Cossacks, peasants, and
tribesmen that ''Peter Fyodorovich" was still alive, was in hiding as an ox herder, and was
waiting to once again emerge and liberate the poor. The result of such myths was
apparent: from the time of Pugachev's execution to the end of Catherine's reign there
were more than [arty local disturbances made in Pugachev's name. A common soldier
hit it right on the mark when be observed that '7hey caught the fish, but his teeth still
remain.,,3 7
These tales and myths about Razin and Pugachev continued to circulate
throughout the entire nineteenth century. To his followers and sympathizers, Pugachev
remained a symbol of peasant revolt. As Paul Avrich notes, the serfs believed that
Pugachev, like Razin before him, was a "resplendent sun ...which having set, must rise
again.,,38 Pushkin's subsequent history of the Pugachev rebellion furthered this sentiment
by connecting it to the image of a soaring bird. In his history, Pushkin presented a
dialogue which took place between Pugachev and the Tsanst General Panin at the time of
Pugachev's apprehension:
Panin: "Exactly who are you?"
Pugachev: "Emelian Ivanovich Pugachev."
Panin: ''Then how dare you, a vor [brigand], call yourself the Sovereign?"
John Channan and Rob HudsoD, 52.
Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels 1600-1800,252.
}6 John ChannoD and Rob Hudson, 48.
37 quoted in Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels 1600-1800, 258.
38 quoted in Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels 1600-1800,260.
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Pugacbev: "I am not the voron [raven], but his offspring. The raven
himself is stitt flying.,,39
This dialogue, whether true or not, was remarkably accurate. For example, the
following song was sung long after Pugachev's execution in the Urals.
Emelian, our own dear father,
Wherefore have you forsaken us?
Our resplendent sun has gone down. 40
Avrich even notes that for many years after Pugachev's death, the peasants of Saratov
calculated the date as before or after Pugachev, in place of Christ.

4

I

Just as Pugachev had

been regarded as Razin's legitimate heir, so the Russian peasantry now sought the next
supernatural peasant rebel leader.

The Theory that is Anarchism
Historically, anarchy has been identified with lawlessness. Yet, we know that
genuine anarchy has never truly existed on the earth because its ideal departs radically
from these imputed results. The final goal of all pure anarchists is the establishment of a
utopian society that accords complete and absolute freedom to each individual. Although
government would not

exis~

such a society would be the opposite of chaotic. A society

of anarchists would be founded upon the principles of the voluntary cooperation and free
association of individuals and groups. It therefore would have no need for a government
or fonnallaws.
Pure anarchism would be freer than a democracy because decision making would
be surrendered by individuals themselves. Anarchy can thus only exist wit.hifl a

Quoted in Paw Avrich, Russian Rebels 1600-1800, 260.
~ Quoted in Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels 1600-1800,251.
~I Quoted in Paw Avrich, Russian Rebels 1600-1800,251.
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voluntarily fonned, like minded group. A societal structure must exist within the
anarcrust society, but that structure must be compatible with each individual's desires.
The individual alone has the power to remove himself from the group, and upon doing so
has no obligation or affiliation with that group. No amount of duress can force the
individual to abandon his right to self-determination and thus anarchists living within an
anarchist society would have an obligation to defend each individual's right to abstention
and independent action. Complete freedom of the individual is the only "rule" or
obligation of pure anarchy. As a result, anarchists equate any fonn of societal structure
that is not universally supported as the domination, degradation, and enslavement of the
individual.
The various interpretations of anarchy passed on to Nestor Ivanovich Makhno in
the Ukraine were originally transmitted from Western Europe to Russia by individual
anarcrust theoreticians in the 1860s. In the 1870's Russian anarchism produced ouly
sectarian anarchist organjzations which were divided over the means and temporary
manifestations necessary for achieving true anarchy. These controversies proved
devastatingly divisive. Differing conceptions about whether anarchy sought to liberate a
class, the individual, or all of humanity eventually proved insurmountable. As early as
the 1860's, three distinct groups of anarchists emerged in Europe and Russia: the
Anarchist Individualists, the Anarcho-Syndicalists, and the Anarchist Communists.
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These three paradigms are useful in defining the parameters of anarchy.
The Anarchist Individualists maintained the most libertarian strain of anarchist
~

theory. They focused upon the individual's right to unlimited personal freedoms. Of
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necessity, this goal positioned its adherents in opposition to any fonn of state or
bureaucratic authority. Of the three international anarchist groupings, the AnarchistIndividualists were the least influential. The reason for their lack of influence is to be
found in the Anarchist-Individualists' central tenet--that any organization of anarchists
was an oxymoron. Since from their experience members of any organization ceased to
be true anarchists, anarchist-individualists necessarily undennined their own chances to
proliferate. 43
On the other extreme, the Anarcho-Syndicalists sought to combine Marxism,
trade unionism, and anarchism. Conceptualized in France in the middle and late 19th
century, the Anarcho-Syndicalists focused their attention upon the group--more than on
the individual. Anarcho-Syndicalists accorded Unions the vital role of changing
working conditions, thereby laying the foundation for further social and economic
change. The Anarcho-Syndicalists' final strategy was to abolish the state through a
proliferation of local and industrial syndicates carrying out general strikes.

44

Because of

its focus on workers' unions, Anarcho-Syndicalism gained its largest following in urban
centers and was less widespread amongst the rural populace. Nevertheless, it was the
second most popular branch of anarchism in Russia.
The Anarchist Communists advocated a middle position that focused upon the
propagation of their message. They felt that individual freedom and human potential
would only develop fully within a freely and harmoniously structured anarchist society.
Anarchist Communists thus envisioned a utopian society consisting of a free federation of
communes with individual members contributing and provided for according to the

4)

4-l

Palij, 62.
Palij, 62,

-----._ .. _- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

Young 25

maxim "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."
The most famous spokesmen for Anarchist

Communis~

in Europe as well as

Russia, were Michael Bakunin and Peter Kropot~. Born into a Russian noble family,
Michael Bakunin began his political activism as a Panslavic populist. During the
Revolution of 1848 he was arrested in Dresden, Germany and spent the next twelve years
of his life in European and tsarist prisons. In 1860 be escaped to Japan and tben to the
United. States and back to Europe. In 1864 Bakunin became an anarchist and joined the
Fist International. Rivalries within the International between the Communists, led by
Karl Marx, and the anarchists led to Bakunin's expulsion in 1872.

45

Bakunin and Marx's views were remarkably similar and at the same time
profoundly different. Both of them criticized the Social Democratic concept of a
"people's state" which they feared would consist of a bureaucracy, ruling experts, and
technocrats. But Bakunin and Marx parted paths over Bakunin's demand that a
revolution must be social and cultural, and not just political. To Bakunin, the creators of
the future utopian society must anticipate tbe future structures of tbe anarchist society
within their existing organizations.
We must demand that tbe International, embryo of the society
of the future, must be the true image of our principles of freedom
and federation and must cast out any principle tending towards
authority and dictatorship.46

Bakunin's understanding of federalism made him believe in any given region or
nationality's right to political and cultural autonomy. At the same time Bakunin's social
~s U1rike Heider, Anarchism: Left, Right, and Green (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1994), 13
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revolutionary anarchist orientation established a new understanding of liberty:
Without political equality there is no real political liberty, but
political equality will be possible only when there is social and
econom\'cal equaIi ty. 47
Bakunin supported nationalist and separatist movements on the condition that they
originate with tbe people and not with a privileged c1ass.4.8
The main thrust of Bakunin's conception of Revolutionary Anarchism was action.
To Bakunin, isolated utopian socialist projects and individual cooperatives were "all fine,
very magnanimous and noble," but, for Bakunin true deliverance could only be achieved
through "struggle and revolt.',49 Perhaps inspired by his early fondness for panSlavism,
Bakunin held that the Slavic peasants were the ideal subjects for such a revolution. In his
mind, the Slavs were noble savages, uncorrupted by bourgeois society arid possessing
unerring communal instincts. 50 Bakunin codified these sentiments into a coda of anti
intellectualism, about which he declared that "For the preservation of the people's liberty,
strength, and passion, ignorance is preferable to bourgeois civilization."S\ For Bakunin,
purity of action was more important than individual knowledge. This sentiment, along
with IUs understanding of equality, justice, and the necessity of Revolutionary Anarchism
were quite influential in Makhno's day, as, indeed, they continue to be to this day.52
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Peter Kropotkin and the Idea of Mutual Aid
Peter Kropotkin's personal evolution toward anarchism paralleled that of
Bakunin. From the time of his youth, when he was a page at the tsar's court, Kropotkin
developed into a populist revolutionary. He became disillusioned with the tsarist state
following the emancipatjon of the serfs, but his sadness soon turned. into resolve.
Kropotkin's commitment to his ideals led him to become a political prisoner, a nihilist,
and a social revolutionary before taking over the reigns of Anarcho-Communism from
Bakunin at his death. 53
While he was profoundly influenced by BakLl.tlin's idea of Revolutionary
Anarchism, Kropotkin sought new ways to strengthen and better express the concepts
behind Anarcho-Communism. Perhaps Kropotkin's most important contribution to
Anarcho-Communism was his critique of Social Darwinism. In the late 19th century,
Social Darwinism was often understood to provide specific evidence that AnarchoCommunism could never reach its goal. Social Darwinism professed to prove that the
principle of the survival of the fittest and competition between individuals was the natural
principle of life. Kropotkin responded with his principle of "mutual aid." Observing the
world around him, Kropotkin saw numerous examples of animals spontaneously helping
one another -- in situations directly conflicting with their own immediate self interest. A
famous example that was often recounted by Kropotkin, involved. a pelican wbich had
been struck blind and was lovingly fed by other pelicans instead of being left behind to
~

die. Kropotkin felt that humans, too, possessed thjs natural inclination toward social
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responsibility and mutual assistance with regard to human beings.

54

There is, in mankind, a nucleus of social habits - an inheritance
from the past, not yet duly appreciated - which is not maintained
by coercion and is superior to coercion. Upon it all the progress
of mankind is based... 55

In effect, Kropotkin's concept of mutual aid accomplished two things for the anarcho
communists: it effectively argued that any group of people, upon achieving anarchism,
would not revert to animalistic or hedonistic tendencies, while at the same time it
supported the typical anarchist view that tbe state's coercion of the masses, supposedly in
their own interest, was unnecessary and insulting to human nature. Anarchy would not

result in widespread rape, pillage, and destruction. Instead, humanity's natural tendency
[or solidarity and mutual aid would emerge and be strengthened. 56
Kropotkin called the resulting solidarity "Communism", which he expressed in
the principle "to each according to his needs, from each according to his ability." In
Kropotkin's view, once the established state was removed, people would remain socially
responsible, but they would do so oJtheir own free will. The eventual result would be a
voluntaristic Communist society in which each individual would achieve true freedom,
but would naturally retain a social conscience. 51
Kropotkin saw societies everywhere evolving toward his mutual aid
understanding of Communism. Like Bakunin and the Russian populists before him,
Kropotkin viewed the obshchina, the traditional Russian peasant commune, as a point of
initiation for social change. To Kropotkin, voluntary contracts, exchange associations
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independent of the state, the Greek Polis, and voluntary agreements all anticipated the
eventual anival of the free society. The final stage of this evolution toward AnarchoCommunist Society would occur when the people realized that their evolution toward this
utopian society was hindered by the "propertied classes", at which point the people would
''break its bonds by violence and realize itself in a revolution.,,58 Because of their
tyranny, capitalists and large landowners would be expropriated and groups of "well
intentioned citizens" would record the extent of the property and food supply and then
distribute everything to the peasants through the village community.
Kropotkin, like Bakunin, objected to authoritarian tendencies in left wing
revolutionary organizations. In particular, he rejected the Bolsheviks' conception of
party dictatorship as the most effective way to end the capitalist era. To Kropotkin's way
of thinking, a new socialist society could be achieved in the least painful manner through
"local construction by local forces..,59 The market, capital, money, social classes, unions,
international contact, and the division oflabor would cease to exist because they would
become unnecessary. For Kropotkin, technology, goodwill, and reason would guarantee
human cooperation in perpetuity.60 Because of such theory and guidance, the program of
the Anarcho-Communlsts was geared toward worldly propagation. In addition to seeking
support from the intelligentsia, which was vital to all proponents of anarchy, the anarchist
communists also sought to incorporate soldiers and peasants, like Nestor Makhno, into
their movement.
Because of the appeal of the Anarcho-Communist approach, anarchist
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missionaries spread their ideas throughout greater Russia from the late 19th century
onward. 61 In fact, Anarchist-Communist theory spread much more rapidly throughout
Russia and the Ukraine than either Anarchist-Individualism or Anarcho-Syndicalism.
The anarchists, however, were always smaller than the Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, or Social
Revolutionaries, in part because of the multi-faceted nature of anarchist ideology.62
As a result of the anarchists' weakness, political parties continued to undermine
anarchism's success in the Ukraine between 1905 and 1917. While urban centers were
split in their Social Democratic party affiliation between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks,
in rural areas "Anarcho-Syndicalist" Socialist Revolutionaries dominated popular
interpretations of liberation. Amidst this ideological intermingling, would be AnarchoCommunists drifted away from the guidance of expatriate leaders like Kropotkin and
Bakunin. 63 As the populist professor Franco Venturi noted of Bakunin, one oithe most
prominent Russian anarchists "he was able to inspire a revolutionary spirit within Russia,
but not a [vital] organization.,,64
Nevertheless, the peasantry's collective memory of the libertarianism espoused
during the Razin and Pugachev uprisings encouraged Anarcho-Commurusm's
independent emergence in Russia during 1917. Moreover, the leftover military hardware
from World War I gave Anarcho-Communists an opportWlity to express and defend the
peasantry's traditionally recurring desires through

anTIS.

All that was needed was a new

charismatic leader with some military knowledge and the will to fight and lead.
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Nestor Ivanovicb Makhno
Nestor Ivanovich Makhno was born in the Ukrainian village of Gulyai Polye. The
village had been founded in 1720 by migrants from the west Ulcraine and was later
enlarged by immigrant Cossacks fleeing from their homeland after Catherine destroyed
the Zaporozhian Sich (self-government). In many ways, the traditions and ideals of the
Zaporozruan Sich still influenced the area around Gulyai Polye. The Zaporozhian Sich
had. extended from Alexandrovsk southword. Prior to being destroyed by Catherine, it
had refused to recognize the authority of the central government and had lived by
plundering Turkish communities around the Azov Sea and the Crimea. The freedomloving traditions of the Sich continued to influence Guylai Polye's inhabitants to
Makhno's day.65
There are many reasons why Makhno eventually became the regional leader of
the Gulyai Polye peasant movemenl. One of the most important was that he shared these
peasants identity and culture. Makhno was born on October 17, 1889 to a typically poor
I

peasant family. When his father died within Makhno's first year, Makhno's mother was
left: without sufficient means to care for her five young children. 66 Her husband's
employer, a non-Ukrainian aristocrat, even went so far as to deny their family the money
he owed Makhno's father upon his death. As a consequence, Makhno began to work at
age seven as a foreign landowner's cow and sheep herder. At twelve Makhno became an
agricultural laborer, and by age fifteen he finally had risen to the meager level of a
foundry shop painter.
World Publishing Company, 1962),399- 400.
64 quoted in Woodcock, 400.
65 Male!, x.;<.
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In these positions, Makhno, like most of his fellow Ukrainian peasants, nurtured

an intense hatred. ofms privileged non-Ukrainian employers. Like most Ukrainian
peasants, Makhno also lacked the means to escape his lot in life, since his entire
education consisted of a m~re four winters of schooling. 67 Yet, unlike the maj ority of his
fellow peasants, Makhno's experiences attracted him to the message of the AnarcmstCommunists at an early juncture.
Makhno's peasant origins, regional orientation, and pro-peasant agenda would
later make him the leader of a peasant revolution. As a regionalist who hated cities and
urban culture, Makhno was in tune with the sentiments of Gulyai Polye's inhabitants.
Like most Ukrainian peasants, Makbno professed peasant folk legends, predicting a
forthcoming golden age in which «peasant free toilers would set to work to the tune of
free and joyous songs. ,,68 In mentality and outlook, Makhno was first and foremost a
Gulyai Polye Ukrainian peasant.
The Gulyai Polye populace's experiences made them receptive to Bakunin's view
that the state in every form was evil and should be combated. Essentially self-interested,
the Ukrainian peasantry's opposition to any form of government focused upon its past
experiences, which produced a universal desire for individual liberty, private ownership
of land, and freedom from «foreign" exploitation. Makhno understood and shared these
widespread desires which eventually allowed him to extend his area of peasant support to
locales outside of his immediate region. 69
Makhno also received a great deal of support because his interpretation of
Jownal of Mennonite Studies 6 (1998): 215.
6/ Nomad, 303.; David Footman, ''Nestor Makbno," in Soviet Affairs, No.2, Sl. Anthony's
Papers, No.6., ed. David Footman (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, L959), 79.
68 Woodcock, 420-421.
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anarchism was compatible with the concept of liberation championed in the Cossack and
peasant rebellions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially those led by
Pugachev and Razin. In fact, Makhno's movement could be seen as the continuation of
these rebellions because it incorporated similar egalitarian sentiments and vociferously
attacked the tyrannical bureaucratic domination of the common people by the state.
Makhno's peasants, like tbe earlier peasant rebels wanted title to the land, and also to be
left alone by all gentry, officials, tax collectors, recruiters, and external agents of
authority. The Ukrainian peasants bad long desired the "society of free toilers" which
Makhno had advocated. Again, like earlier Cossack-led revolts, Makhno's movement
arose in the southern borderlands and was directed against the wealthy and powerful. He
expropriated the landlords, removed government officials, and sought to establish a
Cossack-style "republic" on the steppe. Makhno simultaneously urged the peasants to
fight to establish free soviets and communes while resisting the authority of both the
Whites and the Reds, just as Razin and Pugachev had opposed tsarist authority. In short,
as Alexander Berkman observed, Makhno became "the avenging angel of the lowly, and
presently he was looked upon as the great liberator, whose coming had been prophecized
by Pugachev in his dying moments.,,70
Makhno's personal charisma and bravado also augmented this authority as a
leader. For example, on September 30, 1918, a force of one thousand Austrian soldiers
and special guards surrounded him at the village of Dibrivki, heavily outnumbering the
Makhno partisans with their thirty men and one machine gun. Against these thirty to one
odds, Makhno used a strategic retreat as a ruse and followed it with a reckless attack.
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Upon routing his opponents completely, Makhno's thankful men proclaimed him their
"Balko," or "little father, military chieftain.,,?l So began the persistent myth that
Makhno, like Razin and Pugachev before him, was invincible. 72
The connection with Razin and Pugachev augmented Makhno's support because
the peasantry retained a strong cultural memory of the early rebel leaders in popular song
and stories. Although Makhno never overtly declared himself a new Pugachev or Razin,
he covertly encouraged the connection with the past by adopting similar platfonns and
playing the role of the charismatic popular rebel leader. The results for Makhno were
forthcoming, as his wife recounted:
There grew up among the country folk the belief that Maklmo
was invincible because he had never been wounded during all
the years of constant warfare in sRite of his practice of always
personally leading every charge.
Supported by such legends, Makhno used the peasantry's opposition to the government
and its hatred of officials to facilitate a full scale movement.
Makbno's mythification increasingly positioned him as a historically recurring
symbol ofpeasant revenge. The Makhnovist movement's birth in the southern
borderlands, its opposition to the wealthy and powerful, and its pursuit of land and
liberty, reinaugurated the peasantry's memory of a Cossack-style ''republic'' on the
steppe.
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At the same time, Makhno's destruction of hundreds of noble manors and his

murder of thousands of the peasantry's "enemies" increasingly drew other independent
guerrilla bands and regional anarchist groups to his banner. Even though the peasants
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continued to oppose national governments, this phenomenon reinforced the common
peasant perception of the Makhnovist movement as a type of societal structure. 7S
Because of his desire to popularize and stabilize his movement, Makhno gradually
modified his conceptualization of anarchy. He adopted the peasantry's conception of
freedom - a decentralized government with autonomous individual farms, and gave it the
name "anarchy." To his peasant constituency, this message was vastly superior to a return
to noble domination or economic manipulation by Russian communists ruling from urban
centers. In this way, Nestor Makbno, adressed the social oppression of the peasantry and
simultaneously empowered himself as an anarch.

The Ambiguity of being an Anarch
As the leader of an Anarchist-Communist movement, Makhno was an anarch, or
the leader of an anarchist community. While pure anarchism would not acknowledge the
legitimacy of such a position, Makhno's interpretation of Anarchist-Communist theory
allowed for societal leadership by a vanguard. It seemed to Makbno that anarcbism could
only develop in tbe Ukraine if it had some type of internal structure and a leader to
defend it militarily. The would-be anarchists were surrounded by hostile and well-armed
adversaries, and they needed to defend and even extend their anarchist vision.
It was in this position as leader, however, that many of Makhno's personal
weaknesses and shortcomings became apparent. As an anarch, Makhno did not always
respect other people's individual desires. At times he became arbitrary and absolutist.

.

Even Makhno's admirer, the anarchist poet Valine, noted this failing:
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Under the influence of alcohol, Makhno became irresponsible in
his actions; he lost control of himself. Then it was personal caprice,
often supported by violence, that suddenly replaced his sense of
revolutionary duty; it was the despotism, the absurd pranks, the
dictatorial antics, of a warrior chief that were strangely substituted
for the calm reflection, perspicacity, personal dignity, and self
contTol in his attitude to others and to the cause which a man like
Makhno should never have abandoned. 76
Furthennore, at times, the behavior of Makhno's anny mirrored these negative
aspects of his personal character. While intoxicated, his troops would harass innocent
people. And though it happened infrequently, at times his troops murdered and stole
from those who opposed them.
In his day some anarchists pointed to the Makhnovists' departures from a

theoretically pure form of anarchy as an indication of Makhno's corruption. To these
detractors, Makhno's anarchist rhetoric was merely a means of disguising peasant
regionalism and his own growing personal authority. Guided by their ideology,
Anarchist-Individuals especially rejected Makhno's 'anarchist' organizations because
they believed that propaganda was the sole acceptable technique for encouraging mass
action.
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To their thinking, Makhno's organization, structure, and actions negated his

eventual desire to achieve a utopian anarchist society founded on free communes. As a
result of such sentiments, outside Anarchist-Individualist assistance from greater Russia
seldom occurred.
Yet, the Anarchist-Individualists' critique ofMakhno bad many shortcomings.
Even though he became an anarch, Makhno nevertheless remained a genuine anarchist
because he perceived his leadership and his movement's increasingly
organization as a temporary and
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means to achieve a true anarchy. ill this way,

Young 37

Makhno tried to bridge the gap between worldly success and theoretically pure
anarchism. While at times he did abandon pure anarchism, he did so only out of military,
societal, or practical necessity. While the Anarchist-Individualists valued anarchist purity
above all else and achieved little, Makhno valued revolutionary success slightly more
than anarchism's theoretical purity and accomplished one of the largest and longest
anarchist experiments the world has seen to date.
Regardless of their success, several Makhnovist manifestations were profoundly
ambiguous. In February 1918, Makhno's Congress of Workers, Peasants, and Insurgents
conceived a Regional Military Revolutionary Soviet (council) of Workers, Peasants, and
Insurgents. While the Congress approved this group's formation as the supreme
executive of the Makhnovist movement., they had set limits on the Soviet's authority.
Specifically, the Soviet was limited to following the Congress's instructions and was
dissolvable by the Congress at any juncture. Soon thereafter, however, the Regional
Revolutionary Military Soviet became an actual government run by Makhno's closest
acquaintances. In this capacity, the Soviet, and not the Congress, increasingly made the
economic, political, social, and military decisions affecting the movement. 78 Pressed by
adversaries, the Makhnovist movement had adopted a primitive organizational structure.
This reality was echoed in Makhno's Revolutionary Insurrection Anny. While
his anny was theoretically controlled by the Congress of Peasants, Workers and
Insurgents, which elected the Revolutionary Military SovIet, of which Makhno was a
member, conditions at times forced Makhno to part from this ideal. While his men
directly elected most of their officers, Makhno personally appointed his mends to key
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positions. Nevertheless. Makhno simultaneously retained the plebian character of his
movement. The Makhnovist forces consisted entirely of the ordinary population of the
eastern Ukrainian lands around Gulyai Polye -- between Kharkov, the Don, and the
Crimea. 79 All Makhnovist officers were peasants or factory or shop workers, and not a
single officer carne from the intelligentsia or the upper or middle classes. 8o
With the advent of increased competition with the Bolsheviks beginning in 1919,
the Makhnovist equestrian bodyguards became an anarchist nobility, protecting Makhno
as jfhe were their feudal lord or Bolshevik party chief. Meanwhile, Makhno's
"Intelligence Department" became Makhno's 'anarchist' counterpart to the Bolshevik
Cheka. While Makhno's ideological commitment to anarchy should have necessitated
his rejection of police, prisons, and courts, his '1ntelligence Department" assumed all of
these functions. As a necessity of war, Makhno's followers accepted these
modifications. Sl They understood that Makhno needed to establish a loyal chain of
command amongst widely distributed rural locales.
At times referring to himself as "first amongst equals", Makhno even ordered
arbitrary executions, especially for anti-Semitic acts. Without trials, he shot a troop
commander for raiding a Jewish town and he executed a common soldier for carrying a
poster that read "Beat the Jews, Save Russia." The reason was simple: Makhno's
anarchist movement risked betrayal and division if it incorporated other ideologies,
whether founded on hate or possessing an alternati.ve view oftbe future. 82
At times an excess of "warrior sentiment" resulted in the formation of a military
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clique around MakhnO. 83 Moreover, this clique did in fact act without asking the opinion
of the Soviet or the Congress. As Volin notes,
It lost its sense of proportion, showed contempt toward all those
who were outside it, and detached itself more and more from the
84
mass of the combatants and the working population.

This phenomenon had its roots in the stem tractition of the Cossack legions of the
Zaporozhian region, who met out swift and violent punishments to their political
adversaries. 85 Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the Makhnovist movement's
developing authoritarianism negated some its more libertarian tenets. 86
Another development that seemed incompatible with Makhno's anarchist
commitments occurred in the late winter of 1919 when White forces continued to mass in
the regions of the Caucasus and the Don. With the aim of protecting their region from
White domination, the February 1919 Gulyai Polye meeting of the Congress of Workers,
Peasants and Insurgents declared a ''voluntary mobilization" of all men under forty-eight
years old. 87 Under the spontaneously gathered. de-facto representative government's
terms, those not vehemently opposed. to serving would augment Makhno's twenty
thousand troopS.88
Yet, while the "voluntary" nature of the conscription might seem to save the
purity of Makhno's anarchist principles, White aggression made him fear that he would
be unable to obtain sufficient troops voluntarily. As a result, the May 24, 1919 issue of
the Makhnovist newspaper Road to Freedom clarified the tenn "voluntary": through their
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Congress the peasants as a group had voluntarily decided to be mobilized, and therefore
no eligible individual was permitted to refuse to enlist. 89 Makhno legitimized this
interpretation of the term "voluntary" in two ways. First, he argued that it was a means of
distributing the burden of military service equally and justly. Secondly, he acknowledged
that the peasants would be less afraid of being captured by the Whites if they could say
they had been forced to serve. 90 To Makhno, conscription was in the peasantry's own
best interest and thus mandating it did not violate anarchist prescriptions.
In a similar vein, Makhno also departed froID the ideas of pure anarchy to achieve

greater popularity amongst his peasant constituency by advocating policies that he knew
would gain the peasantry's favor. For example, while Makhno did not issue his own
currency because doing so would blatantly conflict with anarchist doctrine, he sought to
augment peasant support by acx:epting all partisan currencies. Since all other combatants
annulled opposing armies' currencies, this approach won Makhno great favor. 91
Makhno likewise tried to gain additional support for his movement by reducing
crime, which was commonly visited on the civilian population by the various armies
which passed through the region. To this end, Makbno emphasized a concept of
immediate justice in the community's interest. This approach was codified in the
Makhnovists' interpretation of anarchist justice:
We suggest as a basic principle that any rigid court and police
machinery and any definitive codification of laws constitute
infringements of the population's rights of self defense....True
justice cannot be administratively organized, but must come as
a living, free creative act of the community... [L]aw and order must
be upheld by the living force of the local community and must not
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be left to police specialists. 92
In accord with this principle, the Makhnovists generally took over the administration of

justice in the interest of the populace. 93 In almost every small village tbat the anarchist
insurgents occupied, prisons were burnt to the ground and the authority of the police was
undermined, if not threatened to the point of ineffectiveness. A true Anarchist
Communist, Makbno's political perspective required the removal of all organs ofllie
state's tyranny over the rights of the individual. Transgressors were usually exiled from
the region, but if they returned they were often killed outright.
The destruction of the police apparatus resulted in a reduction rather than
an increase in crime because Makhno also imposed strict limitations on his followers'
requisitions of foodstuffs. From the earliest days of their insurgency, Makhno forbid his
troops from taking from private citizens more than absolutely necessary to satisfy the
immediate needs of the men. The general rule of thumb used was that a soldier could
requisition the only the amount of food that he could carry on his person while remaining
a highly mobile foot soldier. Although these abstract orders might seem to have
facilitated uncontrolled looting which would subsequently have undermined the
populace's support for the Makhnovists, Makhno's arbitrary and severe system ofjustice
was an effective deterrent to crime. Depending on the circumstance, a Makhnovist could
be demoted, beaten, or even shot for stealing from the peasants. The results were
forthcoming. The town of Ekaterinoslav, for example, reported fewer robberies under
Makhno than at any other time in the civil war.
While Makhno prohibited looting by his soldiers, he nevertheless expropriated the
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rich as he moved through enemy territory. In so doing, he continued to act as a
traditional benevolent rebel leader: he readily distributed the shoes, cloth, and sugar that
he seized to the peasantry. The combination of reduced theft and beneficent distribution
of pillage produced exactly what Makhno desired: the entire peasant population fonned
his "intelligence department," while all the food his forces needed were voluntarily
handed over by the peasantry.94

Makhno's Conflict with Anarchist Theory
Citing Bolshevik attempts to impose a dictatorship over the Ukraine, the
Makhnovists had in fact prohibited the fonnation of what they termed "Jacobin
revolutionary committees" in late 1919. Departing from their early guarantees not to
attack political parties, the Makhnovists began to limit the Bolsheviks' access to the
press. Yet, Makhno legitimized his anti-Bolshevik policy change by pointing out that the
Bolsheviks had destroyed freedom of the press wherever possible in the Ukraine and had
taken part in a 'criminal' invasion of Gulyai Polye in June 1919. 95 For Makhno, it was
simply a matter of treating an opponent as they treated you. Nevertheless, the fact that
Makhno and his forces increasingly adapted formal anti-Bolshevik principles to further
their movement's ideological success supported the objections of anarchist individualists
opposing Makhno.
Further complicating the issue, was the fact that this new lack of tolerance, which
denied the applicability of a variety of anarchist tenets, was not explicitly expressed or
acknowledged in official Makhnovist declarations. For example, a proclamation
~ Nomad, 323.
95
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published in Ekaterinoslav on November 5,1919, proclaimed full freedom of expression
for everyone except those wishing to "impose a political authority on the working
masses."
1. All Socialist political parties, organizations and tendencies have
the right to propagate their ideas, theories, views and opinions
freely, both orally and in writing. No restrictions of Socialist
freedom of speech and press will be allowed, and no persecution
will take place in this domain.
Remark: - Military communiques may not be printed unless they
are supplied by the management of the central organ of the
revolutionary insurgents, ''The Road to Freedom."
II. In allowing all political parties and organizations full and complete
freedom to propagate their ideas, the Makhnovist Insurgent Anny
wishes to infOIm aU the parties that any attempt to prepare, organize
and impose a political authority on the working masses will not be
permitted by the revolutionary insurgents, such an act having nothing
in common with freedom of ideas and propaganda. 96
Makhno's Anarchist-Individualist detractors argued that he was using anarchism's
opposition to political parties to limit the freedom of his ideological opponents: only
groups advocating principles in line with those of the Makhnovists enjoyed true political
and social freedom. Furthermore, they argued that Makhno had established an
ideological monopoly profoundly hostile toward the Bolsheviks. In addition, many
Anarchist-Individualists objected to what they viewed to be a defacto 'anarchjst'
government in the areas Makhno controlled. The Anarcrust-Individualist found it
difficult to palate such an oxymoronic entity. It was with these sentiments in mind the
Greater Russian anarchist Nabat group first condemned Makhno in 1919:
While possessing many valuable revolutionary qualities, he
belongs unfortunately to that class ofperson who cannot
always subordinate their personal caprices to the good of
the movement. 97
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The sentiments oft:his group were partially valid. From their extreme viewpoint,
Makhno's movement, founded on libertarian ideals, did indeed have an element of
hierarchical, marauding, theoretical corruption within it. 98
The third anarchist conference of ''Nabat,'' which met in Kharkiv in September,
1920, went even further. It drew a more extreme conclusion regarding the Makhnovists'
orientation throughout their struggle:
As regards the "Revolutionary Partisan Army of Ukraine
(Makhnovites)... it is a mistake to call it anarchist.... Mostly
they are Red soldiers who fell into captivity, and middle peasant
partisan volunteers...Through two years of struggle against
different regimes... there was created in the center of the army
a nucleus that assimilated the slogans of nongovernment and free
soviet order. ,,99

This criticism illustrates the profound difference separating the views of the Individualistdominated ''Nahat'' Conference and the Makhnovist movement. Essentially, AnarchistCommunism as understood by Makhno and his followers consisted of the absence of a
formal government and a free soviet order. These goals fell short of what AnarchistIndividualists regarded to be worthy of the title "anarchist." In order to gain the
Anarchist-Individualists' support, however, Makhno would have had to eliminate the
very structure that buttressed his movement's military slrength, which was precisely the
ingredient that allowed his anarchist experiment to exist.
The truth behind the Makhnovist movement departs from these groups' negative
interpretations. Simply put, Makhno, like Peter Kropotkin, was a utopian idealist.
Because he was aware of the realities of his region at the time, however, he had to make
compromises to ensure his continued peasant support alongside his movement's military
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efficiency. He practiced what he preached as much as conditions allowed. A common
peasant at heart, Makhno was not an abstract social theorizer or a man of words. He
constantly worried about the anarchist "paper revolution" going on in Russia. To his
thinking, these men of books were merely mesmerized by their own words and lacked the
will to fight for what they wrote. While he respected their arguments, idealism, and
educational assistance, he could not join them. Far from stuffy words recorded on a page,
anarchism for Makhno was an evolving vital struggle. '00
Makhno saw these temporary departures as a means of facilitating the military
victory that would allow him to encourage and nurture a system of purer anarchism in the
Ukraine. In this aspect, Makhno's greatest achievement for anarchism was his realization
that the removal of established government necessitated anarchism's temporary
construction of an anarchist governmental structure - to defend the aims of anarchism
and to guide the uneducated masses. Like Utopian idealists before him, such as Michael
Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin, Nestor Makhno had to seek an intennediate stage, from
which a utopia could be achieved more effectively. To Makhno, the anarchist ends
justified the anarchistically impure means. While Makhno may have contradicted ideas
of pure anarchy regularly, he never contradicted his own conception oims movement's
vanguard position within anarchism's overall evolution in the Ukraine.
As Avrich observes in Anarchist Portraits, "Makhno's anny was more popular
both in organization and social composition than any other fighting force of his day."lOl
Makhno's Insurgent Army was a self-administered people's revolutionary army. The
movement consisted of peasants and sought ways to give power to those very same
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peasants. While it encouraged the establishment of communes, cooperatives, and soviets,
it rejected the [ormation of an elite dominating group. Furthermore, as Christopher Read
properly notes, the fact that Makhno was successful on a regular basis shows bow fond
the ordinary peasantry was of them because Makhno's guerrilla tactics made Makbno's
men exlTemely vulnerable to informants. As there were very few examples of betrayal, it
is safe to say that the peasantry on the whole solidly backed MakhnO. 102

Meager beginnings: the Gulyai Polye Anarchist Group
Makbno's frustration with the economic and political injustices of the Russian and
Polish nobility following the 1905 Revolution sparked his interest in politics. Yet, as
Michael Palij observes, because the Ukrainian people were ill-prepared for statehood and
because the Ukraine was a constant battleground for invading forces, ''Makhno was a
product of an environment that had nearly lost its national identity."I03 In practice,
Russian policy had eliminated Ukrainian schools and a variety of political
organizations. I04 As a result, the youth ofMakhno's generation lacked slTOng national
leaders. When the governmental forces controlling the Ukraine carried out acts o[
poIi tical terror during the revolution of 1905, Makhno, like many of his male peers,
viewed subversive activity within partisan groups as the only means for redressing his
grievances. Following the disorders of 1905 and 1906, Makhno joined the local Gulyai
Polye Anarchist Communist group at the age of seventeen. lOS This organization
terrorized the bourgeoisie, the police, and the local government in retaliation for the
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increased repression of both anarchists and the Ukrainian people. 106
The Gulyai Polye Anarchist Communists lacked a finn theoretical understanding
of anarchy. As Makhno himself recalled:
Our group had in its ranks not a single educated
theoretician of anarchism. We aU were peasants
and workers. We came from school with incomplete
education. Anarchist schools did not exist. The bulk
of our knowledge of revolutionary anarchism came from
long years of reading anarchist literature and the exchange
of opinions among us and the peasants with whom we
exchanged all we read and understood in the works
ofKropotkin and Bakunin,107
Makhno 's actions as a member of this less learned group soon unintentionally led to the
furthering of ills anarchist education. In 1908 the group's terrorist exploit took the life of
a district police captain, and Nestor Makhno was condemned to death. But because
Makhno was not yet nineteen, he was categorized as a minor. His sentence was reduced
to a tenn often years hard labor, which took place at Butyrki prison in Moscow, ajail
renowned for its subversive political criminals,l08
During the nine years he spent in Butyrski Prison, Makhno advanced his
education and made invaluable anarchist contacts. Under the guidance of his sometime
cellmate, Peter Arshioov, Makhno was encouraged to use the prison library, where he
read works 00 history, unsuccessfully studied the Russian language, and absorbed
military strategy, An ex-railway carpenter and editor of an illegal Bolshevik newssheet
from Ekaterinoslav, Peter Arshinov was a militant and highly educated anarchist-
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communist. 109 As Makhno's prison tutor, Arshinov encouraged the young Makhno to
"Seek out the truth and realize it [yourself]. You will find it no where else." Arshinov's
central beliefwas that freedom and moral self-realization were interdependent. He
believed this interdependence to be the ultimate lesson of true anarchism, and he passed
this tenet on to his impressionable pupil. 110 Although he had originally been affiliated
with the Bolsheviks, Arshinov now tutored Makhno in the application of Bakunin's
critique of Marxian Communism to tbe Bolshevik Party. To Arshinov's way of thinking,
the Bolsheviks were positioning themselves to become a new ruling class of
intellectuals. III Arshinov's prison influence thus deepened the anarchism within the
young anarch Makhno.
The young Nestor Ivanovich Makhno's experiences in Butyrki prison made him a
convinced anarch. Proud and vain, Makhno's constant arguments and innumerable
prison manuscripts earned him the sarcastic nickname "Skromny" (modest).l12 Inspired
by Bakunin, whom Makhno referred to as a "great" and '<tireless" rebel, Makhno was
conscious of the anarchist example he set. He became a serious disciplinary problem for
prison officials. The result, summarized by Max Nomad, was inevitable:
Always at war with the prison guards, he was a frequent guest
in the damp, unheated disciplinary cells. His lungs became affected,
and the constant realization tbat he was doomed, anyhow, might
have still added to his reckless courage and contempt of death. 113

The misery of Makhno 's bondage and tuberculosis furthered his lasting horror of prisons
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and strengthened the resolve of the young self-styled anarch.

114

An Unexpected leader

had been born.
While the anarchists played a relatively minor role in the February 1917
Revolution, this Revolution nonetheless had an important consequence for them: a
general amnesty that freed all political prisoners, including Nestor Makhno and Peter
Arshinov. The anarchist expatriates who returned to Russia in the summer of 1917
found the anarchist movement fundamentally weak. As George Woodcock observes of
the Russian anarchist poet Voline's July 1917 return, he did not see a single anarchist
paper or poster, nor did he encounter any evidence of oral propaganda by "the few
Libertarian groups there.',ll5 To anarchism, Russia was a barren wasteland.
While Arshinov's urge for political activity led him to remain in Moscow, even
though there were few anarchists in the city, a similar sentiment drew Makhno back to his
childhood roots in Gulyai Polye, where the twenty-eight year old ex-prisoner sprung into
political activity. Because of his prison experiences, Makhno had come to view
anarchism as a way ofhfe rather than an unrealizable theoretical ideal. He therefore
viewed himself primarily as a practical revolutionary and only secondarily as a
theoretician. '16
Upon returning to Gulyai Polye after his release from prisoo, Makhno organized. a
union of farm laborers and was elected chair. From here 00 Makhno s reputation and
J

charisma built upoo itself. Early April 1917 he had been elected chair o[the Gulyai
Polye Union of Carpenters and Metalworkers and, more significantly, the Gulyai Polye
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Soviet of\Vorkers' and Peasants' Deputies. 117 In August of 1917 the Russian Provisional
Government was threatened. by the counter-revolutionary Komilov affair and the
Petrograd Soviet issued a universal appeal for supporters to defend the Revolution.
Because of the Ukrainian Provisional Government's weakness, Makhno was able to
further his growing personal authority by establishing and obtaining chairmanship of the
Gulyai Polye Committee for the Defense of the Revolution. Although the anarchist
movement in Gulyai Polye achieved greater organization, Makhno only had a handful of
"conscious" anarchist supporters amongst Gulyai Polye's thirty thousand inhabitants. I 18
The variety of 1917 provincial peasant assemblies served as a focal point for the
discussion of peasant grievances and desires. In these organizations, the peasantry took
steps to organize and legitimize itself on a territorial level, instead of in the more
traditional state organizations. When the state's power over the provinces collapsed in
1917, political power had passed to these local assemblies, which essentially became
autonomous 'governments.' While many of the early (March and April) peasant
assemblies drafted temporary legislation regarding the land question, some local soviets
converted. their authority into direct action, with little concern for the time involved to
officially change these laws. 119

In early August 1917, as head of the regional soviet, Makhno began to supervise
the division of local nobles' estates amongst the peasantry, while handing over control of
Gulyai Polye's small industries to their workers. As Malet observes~ the Gulyai Po)ye
populace, at Maklmo's prompting, was one of the first regions to begin expropriation. 120
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Through such techniques Makhno gained the loyalties of poor peasants, further aiding his
organization of the countryside. 121 While he continued to decry anarchism's lack of
organization as preventing his movement from becoming more than the ''tail of the
Bolshevik-Left Social Revolutionary bloc," Makhno's actions as an anarch had in fact
significantly extended the geographic area of his support to the areas surrounding
Ekaterinoslav.l 22
This support facilitated what Victor Serge referred to as Makhno's unsurpassed
strategic ability and his peasant army's possession of a 'truly epic capacity for
organization and batt Ie." 123 Incorporating a Guerrilla warfare approach, Makhno
achieved military advantage through the peasantry's voluntary provisioning of food,
horses, and

anTIS

at any given locale. When confronted with superior forces, Makhno's

mobility and plebeian support saved him. His army's light, horse drawn tachanki
(peasant carts) could retreat 40 to 50 miles a day under heavy machine gun fue, faster
than any pursuing army. JU Simultaneously, local peasants would send the pursuing
troops on a false trail, allowing Makhno's peasant soldiers to bury their weapons, return
to their villages, resume work in the fields, and wait for the signal to unearth their buried
cache of anTIS and spring up again in an unexpected quarter. 125
Because Makhno's ''troops'' were typically indistinguishable indigenous peasant
farmers and laborers with some World War I experience, their support allowed for new
strategies. In fact, as Christopher Read notes, Makhno's "major asset was the close
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relationship between his activists and the local population.,,126 Like the Russian rebels of
the past, a variety of surprise attacks, quick retreats, and immediate disappearances
became standard protocol for Makhno's forces. 127 As betrayal was extremely rare
amongst Makhno's partisans, in order to eliminate Makhno's forces, any given opponent
would have had to essentially eliminate the entire peasant population. 128
Furthennore, the Makhnovists' mobility was vastly superior to any opposing
force throughout their entire existence because peasant households along the way
supplied them, tended 10 their wounded. augmented their forces, and gave them fresh
horses. As Isaac Babel explains in Red Cavalry Tales, Makhno was
as protean as nature herself Haycarts
deployed in battle array take towns, a wedding
procession approaching the headquarters
of a district executive coIlllIlittee suddenly
opens a concentrated fire, a little priest, waving
above him the black flag of anarchy, orders the
authorities to serve up the bourgeoisie, the
proletariat, wine and music. An army of tacbankas
possesses undreamt-of possibilities of maneuver. 129
Makhno's widespread peasant support thus allowed him to be elusive at the same Lime
that he seemed omniscient and omnipresent. This support positioned Makhno
consistently as a vital opponent to a variety of enemies over three years of almost
constant combat. Because onus successful approaches, years later, Mao Tse-tung
himself even complimented Makhno, calling the guerrilla "a fish in water.,,130
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A Period of Common Enemies: the Red - Makbnovist Alliance
Because Bolshevik slogans like "Land to the Peasants" and "Factories to the
Workers" coincided with the goals ofMakhno's peasant supporters, the Makhnovites
sought further collaboration with the Russian Bolsheviks. Following the Bolsheviks'
seizure of power in October 1917, the results of this approach began to manifest
themselves. In full accord with the purest of anarchist principles, Makhno successfully
negotiated a direct exchange of his peasants' grain for textiles produced by anarchist
communist workers in a Moscow factory.l3I The anarch's preliminary ties with the
Bolshevik dominated Soviet government were thus in accord with Anarchist-Communist
principles.
With World War I grinding on and the advent of revolution in Russia, the
Ukrainian Nationalist Party, in control of the Ukrainian Central Rada (government) at the
time, saw an opportunity to create an independent Ukrainian state. Although it consisted
of some Socialist Revolutionaries, the Ukrainian Nationalist Party, under the leadership
of Simeon Petliura was dominated by the very Ukrainian nobles who manipulated the
peasantry economically and socially. As a result, although it promised to eventually do
otherwise, beginning in April of 1917, the Central Rada refused to establish any sort of
concrete land redistribution program. When the threat of Bolshevik invasion became
imminent, the Ukrainian peasantry grew frustrated with the Rada's apathy and started
redistributing gentry estates amongst themselves. The Rada's response was immediate:
on January 22, 1918 they released their Fourth Universal:
The commission for the settlement of the land question ... has
already worked out a law for the transfer of lands... without
IJl
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compensation; this law is based on the principle oftbe abolition
of the right of ownership and socialization ofland...every effort
will be made to enable the committees to transfer the land to the
toiling peasants before spring work begins.132
The Ukrainian peasants, partisans, and workers interpreted this belated socioeconomic
reform as the Rada's last ditch effort to bolster support in the face of Bolshevik
aggression. The Communist nature of the proposals added strength to Bolshevik
propaganda efforts, and the Ukrainian people grew increasingly hostile to the Central
Rada 133 In line with both popular opinion and their own sentiment that the Rada had
achieved too little, too late, the Makhnovists assisted the Bolshevik's reactionary
infiltration and occupation of the Ukraine in January, 1918. In order to obtain the
military power necessary to support their separation from the Russian Empire, the
Ukrainian Nationalist Party sided with the Central Powers for military assistance during
the early 1918 Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations.
When the treaty was finally concluded in March 1918, Soviet Russia lost its

claim to the Ukrainian tenitory. The Central Powers were not about to let these "radical
plebeians" remain in power, however. Within a few weeks, a proposal for the
reinstatement of Russian and Polish landed nobles' property titles split the fragile
coalition of the Ukrainian Nationalists and the Central Powers. Austrian and Gennan
military authorities immediately used the break as an excuse to isolate and liquidate most
of Petliura's forces. 134
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Fighting SkoTopadsky and Foreign Manipulation
In an attempt to legitimize their authority in the Ukraine, the Central
Powers installed a semi-absolutist puppet monarchy. In the Spring of 1918, the
Ukrainian-Russian puppet Pavlo Petrovych Skoropadsky assumed the Cossack title
"Hetman" and announced himself to be the founder of a new dynasty. These evocative
gestures were largely negated in the peasantry's eyes, however, by the Hetman'5 support
of the overthrown nobles and landed gentry, who above all else wanted to regain their
manorial estates, which local soviet chairs, like Makhno, had stripped away from them in
1917. In fact, on the very first day that the Hetman carne to power he dissolved all the
land cornmitlees and annulled. the Central Rada's abortive land law:
The right of private property, which is the basis of civilization
and CUlture, is hereby fully restored. All [previous] ordinances...
insofar as they infringed. upon the right of private property, are
declared null and void. Complete freedom to buy and sell land is
also reestablished. Measures will be taken toward the alienation
oflands oflarge landowners at their actual cost and toward their
distribution among needy peasants. 135
Like the Central Rada, however, a draft on land reform would be produced by the
Hetmanite government only on the eve of its November collapse. 136
If the Central Rada had proven unresponsive to the Ukrainian peasantry's
revolutionary spirit:, the Hetmanite government proved even less responsive. Under this
puppet government, Austrian-German forces soon dominated the military, political, and
economic life of the Ukraine. While the peasants sullenly returned the nobles' land, they
objected to the appropriation of their grain by the Central Powers, who desperately
needed food to feed their besieged armies on the Western front. The Ukraine's means of
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transportation strained under the high rate of Austro-German appropriations. In response,
the peasants preferred to destroy their crops before they could be removed by the greedy
Gennan and Austrian invaders. The Austro-Gennan occupation armies typically reacted
through arms. 137
As a result of their hopes for the Ukraine, the foreign occupation forces
interpreted insurrectionary groups within the region as rowdy forces terrorizing the
nobles and planting subversive ideas in the minds of the otherwise hardworking peasants.

In fact, groups like the Makhnovists scared the Hetmanite because they responded to the
peasantry's desire for land. Influenced by a strong Cossack tradition of freedom from
government landlords and central bureaucracy, the Makhnovists distributed any land they
captured to the peasantry immediately. Because of this, the Hetman's government
especially targeted Makhno's partisan resistance, who rejected the puppet's continuing
compromises with Gennan imperialism.

138

The German and Austrian response was

immediate: foreign troops massed in the Ukraine in 1918, and Makhno's comparitively
weak following was forced to fiee--first to the east to Taganrog, and then northward
along the Volga toward Moscow-- in pursuit of anarchist support and guidance. 139
Makhno's experiences in Moscow in July 1918 strengthened his grasp of
anarchist theory, and thus were pivotal in his conversion from a village political boss into
a powerful anarchist guerrilla warrior. Just prior to Makhno's arrival in Moscow, the
Bolsheviks had launched an anti-Anarchist campaign in which the Red Army raided
anarchist centers in Moscow and Petrograd, arresting several hundred anarchists. The

.

pretext for this campaign was the seizure of a Red Cross representative's car in April
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1918. The Bolsheviks explained that the campaign was necessary because of "the
criminal activity of anned detachments of counter-revolutionary burglars and robbers
[who] had taken refuge under the black flag of anarchy." Upon seeing the aftennath,
Makhno became disillusioned. In the midst of depression., he sought the advice of
Kropotkin .. 14() At their private meeting in Moscow, the elder anarch's guidance was
straightforward and determined:
One must remember, dear Comrade, that there is no
sentimentality about our struggle, but selflessness and
strength of heart on our way toward our goal will
conquer al1. 141
Makhno would dwell upon these words for the rest ofrus life. They strengthening his
resolve and his willingness to endure personal self-sacrifice as be pursued his own
evolving def~n.se of anarchism in the Ukraine.
An uncomfortable private meeting with Lenin at the Kremlin finally facilitated
Makhno's return to the Ukraine. In this private interview, Lenin criticized the anarchists'
"empty fanaticism" as focusing too much attention on the present. But he maintained
that Makhno himselfwas different, and even went so far as to propose that the
Makhnovists select a region of the U1craine and carry out secret Bolshevik revolutionary
work there in exchange for limited autonomy. While Makhno rejected this proposal
outright, Lenin still viewed Makhno's return to the Ukraine favorably, perhaps because
he knew that Makhno's forces would terrorize the Whites, thus aiding the Red Anny. At
Lenin's prompting an aide issued Makhno false credentials and a Ukrainian uniform, to
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facilitate his train ride home through the Ukrainian frontier. 142
From the time ofms return in July 1918, Makhno viewed the establishment ofa
strong territorial base as his foremost goal. As Arshinov notes,
For a long time he considered the idea of how to
organize the vast peasant masses, in order to bring
out the revolutionary energy that had been (accumulating)
in them for centuries and to hurl this fonnidab1e power
against the existing regime of oppression. He feIt that
the moment had arrived to put his idea into execution. 143

Ironically, the Bolsheviks' persecution of anarchists strengthened the anarchist
movement in the Ukraine. Local Kropotkinist, Individualist and Syndicalist elements in
Kharkov and Kursk established the Nabat Anarchist Confederation in order to unitY the
diverse anarchist movements. Although Makhno had not been directly involved, his
movement benefit from the peasantry's tendency to associate his movement with those
of the propagandistically active "Nabat" Confederation. 144
Another development that benefited the Ukrainian anarchists was the advent of
anti- Skoropadsky sentiment amongst the peasantry. The Austrian and German troops
who supported Skoropadsky continually shot or beat up and burned the villages of
oppositionists. In a move typical of the Skoropadsky regime, they even murdered
Makhno's crippled older brother and burned Makhno's mother's house down because
they were related to Makhno. These circumstances in the Ukraine allowed Makhno to
dress his increasingly militant anarchism in indigenous peasant garb. 145
His first speech at Gulyai Polye finnJy positioned his movement as the supporter
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of the peasantry against outside interference. 146
I returned again to you comrades so we might
work together to expel the AustroAGennan
counterrevolutionary armies from the Ukraine, to
overthrow the government of Hetman Skoropads'kyi
and to prevent any other regime from replacing him.
We will work in common to organize this great thing,
We will work in common to destroy slavery so
we may set ourselves and our brothers and sisters
on the road of the new order,'47
Because Makhoo knew that the peasants were seeking the end of foreign
domination he focused his movement on this issue. The Makhnovists' new central
holding now became that no foreign enemy deserved pity: all who suppressed peasant
rights and exploited their labor would be summarily executed. To facilitate this
militancy, Makhno established a local Revolutionary Military Unit in the swnmer of
1918 to guarantee freedom of action and propaganda in nearby villages and townS. 148

The actions of this military unit, along with MakhnO'5 charismatic leadership.
prompted the Ukrain.ian equivalent of a Robin Hood myth surrounding Makhno's name
that further bound him to peasant revolt predecessors like Stenka Razin, and Emelian
Pugachev. For example, when Makhno's Revolutionary Military Unit attacked large
gentry estates between the Dnieper and the Sea of kov they returned the land to the
peasants,l49 In a similar manner, after winning a battle against Skoropadsky, they would
kill all the opposing officers and free tbe captured soldiers, offering them libertarian
literature and money to help them on their journey borne. ISO Through such techniques,
Makhno's troops made every attempt to perpetuate this positive association.
Shatz, 452.
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Furthennore, Makhno presented himself as a man of action willing to sacrifice
himself for his cause. He continued to reject metaphysical systems, phrasemaking, and
abstract social theorizing. lSI Within a typical early appeal to the Ukrainian peasantry, the
anarch sought to press his personal militancy upon the Ukraine populace:
Conquer or die -- such is the dilemma which
faces the Ukraine peasants and workers at this
historic moment. But we cannot all die, for we
are innumerable -- we are mankind! Therefore, we
will conquer....But we will not conquer in order
to repeat the errors of the past years, that of
putting our fate into the hands of new masters.
We will conquer in order to take our destinies into
our own hands, to conduct our lives according
to our own will and our own conception of the truth. 152
Like most ofMakhno's leaflets issued when he was fighting Skoropadsky, this
propagandistic appeal did not mention the tenn "anarchy" itself. As Max Nomad notes,
Makhno avoided using the term itself and instead expressed the ideas of anarchism in
simple words that voiced hostility to any form of centralized government that would try
to rule from either Moscow or Kiev, either in the name of a "proletarian dictatorship" or a
"bourgeoisie-democratic Ukrainian People's Republic.

II

153

Makbno feared that the term

"anarchy" would only divide his peasant support. As a result, he clung to the concept of
political autonomy, which he believed would unite the peasantry. Through such astute
decisions Makhno gained widespread support for his movement. His Project-Declaration
of the Autumn of 1919 especially succeeded in his anarchistic aim of guiding Hetmanite
resistance away from affiliation with nationalist forces:
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In speaking of the independence of the Ukraine, we
do not mean national independence, a Petliura sort of
autonomy, but the social and labouring independence
of the workers and peasants. We declare that the toiling
people of the Ukraine-or anywhere else-have the
right to self-detennination... but not in the national sense. 154

While Makhno would frequently champion Ukrainian culture, as an anarchist he always
held nationalism suspect and tried to guide the masses away from it.
Makhno's plethora of guerrilla tricks likewise wore down Skoropadsky's forces,
thereby further increasing Makhno's prestige. Although Makhno's Revolutionary
Military Unit had begun modestly, with five men attacking a Russian noble's manor, and
confiscating all the noble's rifles, horses and police uniforms, these actions rapidly
gained momentum. At the next opportunity Makhno's newly enlarged forces, dressed in
the uniforms of the Ukrainian police, the Varta/ 55 gained entrance into a ball held by the
local gentry, and killed all of those in attendance. 156 At other times, a Yarta-uniformed
Makhno would penetrate the enemy ranks, learn their plans and preparations, and then
leave with a group of soldiers to capture 'Makbno,' exterminating the Skoropadsky
guards on the way. 157
Makhno's military vitality facilitated the destruction of Hetman Skoropadsky's
regime. Constantly nipping at their heels, Makhno's forces even defeated entire elite
German divisions. 158 Such Makhnovist harassment drove the Hetman's forces from
Gulyai Polye by September 1918. With the German and Austrian occupation forces'
subsequent withdrawal under the November 1918 armistice, the puppet's situation only
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worsened. Hetman Skoropadsky now stood alone. The removal of the one half million
foreign soldiers proved a devastating loss for the puppet government of the Ukrainian
People's Republic, and it collapsed immediately.
The resulting power vacuwn plunged the Ukraine into a turbulent civil war. The
Ukrainian nationalist leader Simeon Petliura once again emerged from hiding and forced
the Austro-German puppet Skoropadsky to flee from Kiev. With Makhnovist aide, the
Russian Bolsheviks again swept down from the north, captured Kiev, and forced Petliura
to retreat. While the Petliurist and Bolshevik forces fought one another in the area
around Kiev, the Germans, the Austrians and Denikin's army exerted only a tenuous
hold on" the region. Because the Ukrainian commercial classes, landlords, and the
bourgeois clung to the nationalist movement around Kiev, the Makhnovists were the only
significant force in the region fighting for the revolution against foreigners at the time.

159

Makhno decided to use his movement's strength and the region's fragile peace to
establish a southern libertarian society to serve as a model for all of Russia. 160 In a 1919
proclamation he encouraged greater economic independence and more self-determination
amongst his peasant constituency when he declared:

It is up to the workers and peasants to organize themselves
and reach mutual understanding in all aspects of their lives
and in whatever manner they think right.t6t
Of course, in a fully anarchist society such a statement would not have had to
have been made, as each individual would have assumed this right. But under these
preliminary and fragile circumstances, the Black's explicit permission to experiment
resulted in the proliferation of free communal societies. From November 1918 to June

159
160

Christopher Read., From Tsar to Soviets (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996),259.
Avricb., Portraits, 113.

Young 63

1919, the period during which both the Whites and Reds remained outside the area east of
the Dnieper River, four "free" communes sprouted up in Gulyai Polye, with several more
in surrounding districts. Each commune consisted of about a dozen extended households

and between one and three hundred members. It appeared that Makhno had achieved his
objective. Makhno himself even labored on a Gulyai Polye commune when time allowed
and encouraged the formation of analogous societies throughout Soviet Russia. 162
Yet, in actuality these "free communes" were not genuinely anarchistic. While

the peasants who Jived and worked in the communes were happy with their new
circumstances, most were not anarchists, although Makhno s.aw to it that each commune
contained a few anarchjst peasants. It is true that they held their land, kitchens, and
dining rooms in common, and lived the Anarcho-Communists' ideal of full equality;
"From each according to ills ability, to each according to his need.,,163 In fact,
Kropotkin's idea of mutual aid was their principle tenet. Thus, like Makhno's anarcillsm
itself, the temporary identity of Makhno 's "free communes", departed from the
theoretical ideals of pure anarchism, while maintaining the spirit of AnarchoCommurusm. l64 A superficial example of the success of Makhno's anarchism, these
communes were actually temporary manjfestations on the path towards the Makhnovists'
goal of establishing anarcillstically pure conununes at a more stable later date.
Simultaneously, the Makhnovists made the best of the absence of warfare in the
Southern Ukraine, seizing substantial quantities of abandoned arms and equipment from
the retreating Gennans and Austrians. Thanks in part lo these provisions, the Makhnovist
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movement grew to a substantial size, increasing to a few regiments of infantry and
cavalry and even a battery of artillery. Of all of the partisans in this early phase of tbe
Ukrainian civil war, Makhno's forces made tbe most dramatic gains in military
hardware. 165
With the Makhnovists new military power and renewed Bolshevik support,
I

Makbno's forces assisted the Bolsheviks against Petliura's Nationalist regime. At the end
of December 1918, Makhno was able to seize the Nationalist-occupied Ekaterinoslav
through a strategic military infiltration. Augmented by a number of armed Bolshevik
workers, the Makhnovists boarded a freight train, crossed the Dnieper bridge, and seized
the city's central railroad. station. Although Makhno's forces fled the town when the
Nationalist troops returned en mass, Petliura's demoralized troops soon left the region
when the Red Army advanced on the town. Makhnovist-Bolshevik. cooperation had once
again proven its preeminence in obtaining control over the urban Ukraine. 166

In this first short adventure as an urban occupation force, the Makhnovists
established the ambiguous governmental principles that would thereafter guide their
interactions with towns. While Makhno's forces would never use their power to
dominate or influence politics, they readily channeled their energy into attacking police
stations and prisons. Yet, because Makhno guaranteed freedom of speech, press,
conscience, assembly, as well as unfettered political and ideological association
everywhere in perpetuity, he went through extraordinary efforts to prove that he was not
a dictator masquerading as an anarcmst. 167 A typical notice, posted by Makhno' s troops
as soon as they entered a town like Ekaterinoslav, sought to retain some elements of
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anarchist principle:
To all the workers of the city and its environs!
Workers, your city is for the present occupied by
the Revolutionary Insurrectionary (Makhnovist) Anny. This
army does not serve any political party, any power, any
dictatorship. On the contrary, it seeks to free the region of
all political power, of all dictatorship. It strives to protect the
freedom of action, the free life of the workers, against aU
exploitation and domination.
The Makhnovist Army does not therefore represent
any authority. It will not subject anyone to any obligation
whatsoever. Its role is confined to defending the freedom of
the workers. The freedom of the peasants and the workers
belongs to themselves, and should not suffer any restriction.
It is up to the workers and the peasants themselves to
act, to organize themselves, to reach mutual understanding in
an fields of their lives, in so far as they desire it, and in
whatever way they may think. right.
They must, therefore, know right away, tbat the
Makhnovist Army will not impose on them, will not dictate to
them, will not order them to do anything. The Makhnovists can
only help them, by giving them opinions or advice, by putting
at their disposal the intellectual, military and other forces that
they might need. But they cannot, and, in any case, will not
govern them or prescribe for them in any way,l68

.

Under the Makhnovist administration normal urban life resumed and Makhno
gained converts. Shops reopened, people worked, markets were held, and government
administrators resumed their normal functions. Because Makhno's occupation forces
espoused popular libertarian doctrine while they allowed established societal structures to
be retained, they won many new adherents.
The popularity, strength, and solidarity of Makhno's movement rendered him a
prime potential ally for any force in the civil war. Because of the Ukraine's strong
tradition of opposition to central governments, Makhno's peasant supporters.were
attracted to the populist rhetoric of revolutionary Bolshevism. They supported the idea
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that political power should rest with the people and they liked the soviets, which the
Bolsheviks supported. In addition, because they associated the Whites and their landlord,
officer, factory owner, and commercial class supporters with the old regime and a
cessation ofthe revolution, they considered these allies to be their sworn enemies. While
living in exile after the war, General Denikin would later accurately record that "The
Makhno movement was...the most antagonistic to the idea of the White movement.,,169
The Makhnovists were aware of the White's lootings and their reprisals against unanned
commoners. These sentiments soon manifested themselves in both Makhnovist and
peasant support for the Bolsheviks as they entered the Ukraine in 1919.

170

In fact, when Makhno's enlarged Insurgent Army met the Bolshevik Red Anny at
Alexandrovsk in January 1919, the Bolsheviks were extraordinarily happy to agree to
common action against the Whiles. 171 Neither group wanted a retum to Tsarism and the
Whites were unpopular amongst the peasantry as a whole. The stage was set for further
Bolshevik-Makhnovisl cooperation.
The results were immediate. UpOD capturing a hundred carloads of grain
following a February victory over the Whites, Makhno sent the booty to the emaciated
Bolsheviks in Petrograd and Moscow. The Soviet press quickly complimented Makhno
as "the heroic guerrilla leader of the south." In this amicable atmosphere, in March 1919,
Makhno reiterated the pact for joint action against the Whites. 172
At the same time, however, Makhno pushed for autonomy that went beyond the
tenns of the agreement. The pact stipulated thal Makhno would retain his own division
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within the Red Anny, complete with its own officers, structure, name, and black banner

but would act under the authority of that army_ In reality Makhno saw to it that
Bolshevik control over his forces was only nominal.
A charismatic leader amongst his men, Makhno drew all his military power from
his movement's independence. Although he liked being allied with the Bolsheviks, he
resented their attempts to incorporate them into the Red Army.)7) In a similar manner, its
likely that Makhno would have pressed for the Ukraine's autonomy, had he not just
assumed that the region would remain free from Bolshevik central interference.

174

Makhno was unwilling to share his loyalties or to lose his independence.

The Makhnovists' Changing View of the Bolsheviks
With time, diverging anarchist perceptions of the Bolsheviks split the Russian
anarchist conununity. While the majority of anarchists decried Bolshevik attempts to
establish strong single-party authority following October of 1917, others like Alexander
Schapiro, urged to collaborate with the Bolsheviks in the hope of furthering social
revolution. 175 Moreover, while anarchists on the whole initially saw the Bolsheviks'
domination of the soviets as a genuine expression of the will of the people, some began to
view the soviets as instruments of Bolshevik authoritarianism. 176
At the same time that Makhno's forces were establishing themselves as a regional
force opposed to the Whites, his peasant partisans were beginning to grow apprehensive
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of Bolshevik actions in the Ukraine. The differing conceptions of the soviets held by the
peasants and the Bolsheviks proved fundamental to this rift. In ideal teons, the Ukrainian
peasant volunteers understood the slogan "soviet power" as their own autonomous
freedom from a centralized state. They viewed "soviet power" as equivalent to their
traditional conception of freedom} and as guaranteeing their right to elect their own
military leaders.

177

The Bolsheviks' unique view conflicted this conception. They saw

the task of Soviet power in the Ukraine as one 0 f strengthening the "dictatorship of the
proletariat." And} as a consequence of their ideology, they sought the political hegemony
of both the cities and the Bolshevik party. The role assigned to the Russian and
U1crainian countryside was that of semi-passive support of the Bolshevik cause: the rural
peasants were expected to supply recruits to the Red Army and food to the new regime to
facilitate its victory in the civil war against the Whites. 178
The Bolsheviks' attitude toward the countryside paralleled the grain requisitions
implemented in Russia from 1918 onward. They failed dismally in Russia and met with
even greater resistance amongst the Ukrainian peasantry because there was a national
element to the universal rural-urban resentment toward Bolshevik requisitions. The
Ukraine's tradition of farming in autonomous homesteads contributed to the peasantry's
perception of the dictatorship of the city over the countryside as first and foremost a
dictatorship of the Russian and Jewish urbanites over the Ukrainian peasantry. The
peasantry wanted private land ownership and felt cheated when the Communist
government kept the gentry's expropriated land, essentially becoming the new landlord in
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the countryside. I19 These chaotic and excessive Russian food requisitions to support
both the proletariat and the Red Army gave the Makbnovists cause for concern. Despite
promises that the rate of requisitions would remain at the 1918 level, fully twice as much
grain was requisitioned from the Ukraine in 1919 as in 1918.
The export of foodstuffs to Russia without compensation generated feelings of
being robbed by the non-Ukrainian Muscovites, 180 The fact that there were several grain
requisitioning agencies with overlapping jurisdictions only furthered peasant resentment.
The People's Commissariat of Food Supply, based in Moscow, the Food Supply Agency
of the Donbass Region, Tsentrosoiuz, the Council of Workers Cooperatives in the South,
and various Red Army supply agencies issued conflicting decrees about gathering
foodstuffs that always ended with the statement "in case of nonfulfillment - to be shot."
To the Ukrainian peasantry, this was nothing more than a ruthless medieval collection of
tribute, and they simply gave their grain to the requisition group with the superior

military force. The Ukrainian peasantry's exploitation increasingly paralleled that of
earlier Imperial Russian serfs. 181
The militant and spontaneous response of the peasants of the Southern Ukraine
began at the end of March 1919, after only two months of Bolshevik rule. Although
three-quarters of the rebels were poor peasants, all strata of the countryside participated.
Under the slogans "Down with the Communists" and "Soviets without the Communists"
the entire region between Gomel and Chemigov rose up against the Bolsheviks.
Decrying the forced delivery of grain, the Cheka, and the policy of socialist land use, the
U1aainians rebelled against Bolshevik rule ninety-three separate times in April of
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1919.
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The summary of a Bolshevik Food Supply Commissar, N. Pliusnina, seems

appropriate:
They reckoned that they would receive all the landlords' lands.
And when they did not get them, they began to wreck state
farms in all possible ways. They stole bay and crops in the fields.
They destroyed houses... it was dangerous for Communists to
appear in isolated villages. 183

In this highly political climate, a Makhnovisl resolution issued earlier, at the February
1919 Congress, gained the movement additional peasant support. This resolution directly
opposed the Bolsheviks' policy on expropriated gentry land:
Since the land is nobody's and since only those who till it
should have the right to use it, all land must be owned by
the laboring Reasantry of the Ukraine and distributed freely
and equally. 84

1919 Joint Actions with the Bolsheviks Against General Denikin
Although concerned with their partner, in times of need the Makhnovists would
still ally with the Reds to facilitate the defeat of the universally despised Whites. In fact,
under its ambiguous status as a semiautonomous unit in the Red Army, the Revolutionary
Insurrection Army held a seventy mile front to the north of Mariupol on the Sea of Azov
from January to June 1919 against general Denikin of the White Anny. Makhno returned
to the clever guerrilla ruses which his base of support facilitated:
His boys, wearing plain peasant garb, would enter a city
or other urban settlement to sell their cabbage in the
marketplace. At a whistle's blow, the buggies with the
cabbage were turned upside down, the concealed machine
guns were in operation, and the city was occupied before
Brovkin, I31-132.
Brovkin. 110-112.
1&3 Brov~ 109.
184 Brovkin., 108.
181

182

Young 71

the Whites could think of organizing any defense. 18S
Frustrated by such tactics, the Whites imposed draconian measures. They began
summarily roasting Makhnovist prisoners alive on red-hot iron sheets. At the same time,
they specifically targeted Makhno, placing a price of a half a million rubles on his
head. 186 As White forces continued to mass in the regions of the Caucasus and the DOD,
Makbno's came to desire conscription through anarcbistically pure congresses of the
people. 187 As mentioned earlier, the February 1919 Gulyai Polye meeting of the
Congress of Workers, Peasants and Insurgents declared a "voluntary mobilization" of all
men under forry-eight years old, which was essentially mandatory. MakJmo hoped this
would give the peasants less reason to fear being captured by the Whites. After all,
should they happen to be captured, they could say in all honesty that they had been forced
to serve. IS8 To Makbno, conscription was a way of protecting his peasant volunteers.
Through such successful approaches, the Bolsheviks began to perceive Makhno's
peasant movement as a powerful potential regional rival. In many ways their concern
was well founded. The Ukrainian peasantry saw elements of a utopian protest against the
emerging Bolshevik state in Makhno's program. For the peasantry, support for Makhno
meant nothing less than the nonpayment of the Bolshevik taxes, which they saw as
supporting the unnecessary Bolshevik bureaucracy. 189 Makhno's anarchist movement
increasingly appealed to the entire peasant population as a powerful ideology, opposed to
Bolshevism and advocating a more desirable social alternative.
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The Makhnovists' Formal Break with the Bolsheviks: The April
through June 1919 Regional Peasant Congresses
The Bolsheviks' fear of Makhno's potential opposition peasant government was
soon legitimized by the actions ofMakhno and like-minded anarchists. In a pamphlet
entitled the "General Theses of the Revolutionary Insurgents Concerning the Free
Workers' Soviet," the Makhnovists attacked the Bolsheviks' conception of the soviets.
To the Makhnovists, a soviet should be entirely independent of political parties and
should be part of an overall economic system founded on social equality. The members
of the soviet should be genuine workers and peasants, not bureaucrats or politicians, who
served the interests of the masses.

190

The response to this pamphlet was immediate: the same peasants who were
hostile to the Bolshevik-dominated soviets and state [anns readily set up new soviets and
free conununes under Makhno. In this environment of competition between the
Bolshevik and Makhnovist ideological approaches, even the usually critical Greater
Russian anarchist conference of<~abat" in Kharkiv(K.harkov) championed the
Makhnovist version at their Apri11919 meeting: "[We oppose] all participation in the
(Bolsheviks ') soviets, which have become purely political organs, organized on a
authoritarian, centralist, statist basis.,,191
This ideological competition and growing anti-Bolshevik peasant sentiment led

.

the Bolsheviks to view Makhno's April 1919 call for a meeting of the Congress of
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Peasants, Workers, and Insurgents as an act of rebellion. Makhno's military superior in
the Red Army, Bolshevik Division Commander Pavel Dybenko, was curt and to the point
when he prohibited the congress in a telegram to Makhno.
Any kind of congresses held by the Gulyai Polye Revolutionary
Headquarters, which I have [hereby] dissolved, are considered truly
counterrevolutionary. The organizers of such congresses will
be subjected to most repressive measures including pronouncing
them to be outside the law. I order (the Makbnovites) to take
measures immediately not to allow such occurrences. In

In defiance, the Congress met anyway, on April 10, 1919. The participants
viewed themselves not as an assembly of counterrevolutionaries, but as those "who first
raised the banner of social revolution in the Ukraine, and have gone further to the left
than the Bolsheviks.,,193 The Makhnovist congress did not flinch from proclaiming their
opposition to the excesses of Bolshevik rule.
The current situation in Russia and the Ukraine is characterized
by the seizure of power by the Communists-Bolsheviks who do
not balk at anything in order to preserve and consolidate their
power by armed force acting from the center. The party is
conducting a criminal policy in regard to the social revolution and in
regard to the laboring masses...We protest against the reactionary
habits oftbe Bolshevik rulers, commissars, and agents of the Cbeka,
who are shooting workers, peasants, and rebels, inventing all kinds
of excuses, and that is confmned by the documents we have. The
Cheka which were supposed to struggle with counterrevolution
and with banditry have turned in the Bolsheviks' hands into an
instrument for the suppression of the will of the people. They have
grown in some cases into detachments of several hundred armed
men with a variety of arms. We demand that all these forces be
dispatched to the front. 194
Accusing the Bolsheviks of rigging the elections to the Third Congress of Soviets
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in the Ukraine, subsequent Makhnovist Congresses demanded the removal of all
appointed commissars and the reinstallation of military and civilian elections. Moreover,
they demanded that people's cooperatives be opened, grain requisitions stopped, and
complete freedom be allowed for left wing political parties. The Ukrainian peasantry
increasingly followed Makhno because he voiced the practical and ideological grievances
of an otherwise silenced people. The anarchist Makhnovist movement felt itself firmly
enough established on the steppes of the southeastern Ukraine to make demands as the
representatives of the populace. 195

In response, Leon Trotsky, the head of the Red Army, initiated the covert political
suppression and physical liquidation of the Makhnovists, who were still officially part of
the Red Army. Implying that Makhno's forces were common thieves, Trotsky
maliciously labeled them a ''Bandit army" in official documents. Makhno's execution of
two Cheka agents sent to assassinate him in May frustrated Trotsky's agenda, however,
and Trotsky turned his attention to the Greater Russian anarchist movement 1% Anarchist
activities in Petrograd were suppressed, and in Moscow the Cheka raided and shut down
the publishing offices of the newspaper Anarchy. Only six months after the October
Revolution the Bolsheviks had found a new mortal enemy - the popularly supported
anarchist military government under MakhnO. I97
Because the Bolshevik soldiers serving in the Ukraine were often Ukrainian
peasants themselves, Makhno's movement also threatened Bolshevik strength through
troop defection. In fact, many soldiers in the Bolshevik ranks were already anarchists.
Even those who were not anarchists saw the utopian visions of the Communists and
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anarchists as remarkably similar. From the typical soldier's point of view, Bolshevism
was an unavoidable first step toward the destruction of semi-feudal Russian Tsardom.
Since Lenin himself had promised that state compulsion would disappear in the later
phases of the revolutionary process, cooperation with the Bolsheviks seemed to the
cornmon soldiers, as welJ as to many anarchists, the path toward greater freedom and
equality. Consequently, the anarchists and draftees within the Red Army were
profoundly uncomfortable with their new position as an anti-Makhnovite force. 198
These realities drew swift response from the Bolsheviks. Because the
Makhnovists continued to issue resolutions critical of the communists and the Cheka, the
Bolshevik Commander-in-Chief. Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko, sought to reorganize
Makhno's brigade within the Red Army, strengthening the Bolshevik elements while
neutralizing the anarchist influence. 199 Makhno resisted, forcing the Bolsheviks to
increasingly employ only Russian or international units, to avoid further local troop
defections. 200
When the Reds employed lJkrajnian troops the results were predictable. An event
from the late winter of 1919 serves as a perfect example: two thousand peasant
Makhnovists with two field guns and eight machine guns attacked the city of
Alexandrovsk. The Red Army sent a three hundred-man cavalry detachment to defend
the city. Without firing a shot, the cavalry attachment quickly joined the rebels.
During this time period, Makhno simultaneously gained twenty thousand new
civilian peasant recruits -. a full quarter of the Red Army's troops in the Ukraine. By the
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spring of 1919 Makhno's known rebel forces were at forty-five thousand - fully half the
size of the Ukrainian Red Anny. The Makbnovists were becoming a formidable potential
opposition force -- one that the Bolsheviks felt they had to annihilate. 201
When the Whites advanced north toward Kharkov and west toward the central
Ukraine in May 1919, the Bolsheviks saw the opportunity to exterminate tbeir unreliable
ally. Withdrawing the Makhnovists' ammunition supply and removing as many men and
rolling stock from the Ukraine as possible, the Bolsheviks threw Makhno's semi
autonomous Thirteentb Division of the Red Army against Denikin's forces. Given onesixth of the amount of ammunition necessary, Makhno's forces could do little against the
superior French and British cannons and machine guns that opposed them. 202 Inevitably,

the Whites broke through Makhno's lines in June, threatening Kharkov and the central
Ukraine. The Bolsheviks were more than willing to sacrifice Ulaainian territory to the
Whites if it would facilitate Makhno's demise, for the Makhnovists' popularity made
them a much more profound threat than the pro-gentry Whites, who continued to be

bated by al1. 203
Not mentioning the lack of ammunition and other vital military support, the
Bolsheviks attempted to equate Makbno's libertarian principles wjth treasonous military
ineffectiveness. As early as June 2, 1919, three high ranking Bolshevik speakers on the
Kharkov city soviet blamed the collapse of the front on the "shameful retreat of the
Makhno bands.,,204 At the same time, a Petrograd newspaper reported that Makhno
would be executed if captured because his libertarian ideology encouraged chaos within
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nearby Red ranks. The newspaper argued that the Makhnovist movement's libertarian
mood "had embraced the neighboring (Red) army, and this predetennined the defeat of
the Red Army.,,205 Trotsky elaborated upon these accusations, facilitating Makhno's
removal from the Red Army:
the opening of the front to the Whites, before whom the
Makhno brigade.... invariably [retreated, was a result of]
the incapaci~, the criminality, and... treason on the part of
the leaders. 2 6
To further substantiate the need for Makhno's removal, Trotsky even played up a
correspondence between the White General Shkuro and Makhno that the Makhnovists
themselves had satired in their newspaper The Road to Freedom. Grossly misinfonned
by a prisoner seeking a pardo~ General Sbkuro had been told that Makhno now favored
counter-revolutionary measures. Makhno's real response had obviously clarified matters:
he shot the soldier delivering the White proposal for unified action. Nevertheless, the
Bolshevik press reprinted the Road to Freedom satire as evidence of ongoing negotiations
between Makhno and ShkurO. 207 Trotsky moreover insisted that "no government" was a
cunning anarchist device used by the Makhnovists to cover up their attempt at
establishing a government of their own,20S On June fourth, Trotsky made this sentiment
concrete when he once again declared that delegates to a recently elected Congress would
be declared outside of the law. 209
Consequently, Makhno officially relinquished his position as Division
Conunander within tbe Red Army on June 9. Accompanied by his personal bodyguard of
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two hundred cavalry, Makhno retreated west of the Dnieper River, continuing to eany on
guerrilla warfare against the Whites. Meanwhile, troops loyal to Makhno remained
within the Red Anny, awaiting a signal to rejoin an independent Makhnovist
Revolutionary Insurrection Army.2ID Makhno hoped that leaving these troops behind
might placate the Red Army commanders so that they would leave him alone.
Persisting Bolshevik fears of Red troop desertion to Makhno soon led to the
Bolsheviks' formal break with the entire Makhnovist movement, however. When the
Makhnovists called for a June 15, 1919 Congress at Gulyai Polye they invited Red Army
solctiers to send delegates. Because the Makhnovists continued to ignore Trotsky's
prohibition on the Congress, the Bolsheviks forced the closing of all ofMakJmo's free
communes.

211

Trotsky simultaneously renewed his personal vendetta against Makhno. Issuing
an order for Nestor Makhno's arrest, public trial, and execution, Trotsky sent Klementi
Voroshilov, the Soviet Commissar of Defense, and a Cheka detachment to capture
Makhno. Warned of these events by several Red Army division generals, Makhno
surprised and saved the lives of his would-be assassins at the very moment they were
ambushed by a White detachment. The Bolsheviks did not demonstrate similar chivalry,
however, when later that very day Voroshilov arrested and executed a large part of
Makhno's Gulyai Polye regional government. The Bolsheviks officially outlawed
Makhno's movement? 12
In retaliation, Makhno gave the signal and his troops in the Red Army simply left
their commanders. These and other deserters from the Red Army provided a fresh core
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of one thousand four hundred men, six hundred cavalry armed with eighty machine guns,
ten pieces of field artillery, and two annored cars. In the course of their military
missions, these forces increased further to twelve thousand men, two thousand five
hundred of them cavalry.213 Almost all ofMakhno's forces, located in every province,
included a large number of Red Army deserters. 214
Makhno's augmented forces continued to attack tbe Bolsheviks. In their travels,
the Makhnovists destroyed all signs of Bolshevik rule. They antagonized the Cheka and
the various Red grain collection agencies, and killed all Bolshevik commissars in the
villages through whicb they passed. Simultaneously, the Makhnovists took special pains
to re-establish new libertarian communes as an expression of their sovereignty.21S
During this same period, Grigoriev, an ex-Red Army general and rabid antiSemite, who was leading a variety of irregular combatants also attacked the Red Army's
detachments in the Ukraine. The combined effect of the attacks by tbe Makhnovist and
Grigoriev forces was to decimate the Red Anny in the Ukraine, thus unintentionally
aiding the Whites. Temporarily freed of their main. Red antagonist, the White troops
were revitalized. The result was devastating for the Reds; their entire Crimean Army
disintegrated and the front opened to allow significant White advances. 216 With the Reds
offering less resistance than they had earlier, Denikin's White Army took Kharkov in the
end of June, the Central Ukraine in July, and was well on the way to Kiev in August
1919. 217 Outlawed by the Bolsheviks, Makhno was forced from his homebase into the
area surrounding Alexandria; a region controlled by a pogromist named Grigoriev.
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Despite tills brief alliance, in regards to Jews, the ideals ofMakhno's forces
departed from the commonly held anti-Semitism of the typical Ulcrainian peasant. As
Avrich notes, although Makhno has since been charged with anti-Semitism by a handful
of sources, these objections are "without exception... based on hearsay, rumor, or
intentional slander, and remain undocumented and unproved.,,218 In fact, a considerable
number of Jews took part in the Makhnovist movement, and Jewish intellectuals such as
Volin and Baron held key positions within Makhno's Cultural-Education Commission.
Makhno's Insurgents in fact supported Jewish rights throughout its existence, at times
even to the point of executing peasants professing anti-Semetic rhetoric. 219
Although the Makhnovists were thus not anti Semites themselves, a brief
Makhnovist alliance with Grigoriev's anti-Semetic bandits soon followed. no Trotsky
made great propagandistic use ofMakhno's unfortunate alliance. Continuing his antiMakhno campaign in the Bolshevik press, Trotsky wrote:
Scratch a follower ofMakbno and you will find a follower
of Grigoriev. More often than not you don't even have to
scratch: a frantic kulak or a petty speculator barking at the
221
Communists frankly sticks out on the surface.
Under such incessant pressure from all sides, Makhno sought to regain the purity
ofbis movement. Upon intercepting messages that Grigoriev had exchanged with the
Whites, Makhno unmasked Grigoriev at a public meeting in Sentove, while two of ills
men shot the general. 222 Explaining Grigoriev's betrayal of their forces to the Whites,
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Makhno quickly won Grigoriev's troops over to his side, thus augmenting the
Makhnovist forces, as had been his intention from the beginning. 223

Strength Under Fire
With his strategic use of these reinforcements, Makhno was able to anniliilate the
Denikinist counterrevolution in the autumn of 1919, to the immense benefit of the Reds.
Surrounded by a section of the White Army at the village ofPeregonovka, near Uman,
the fate of the Makbnovist Army seemed sealed. Nevertheless, Makhno's strategy burst
forth on September 26, 1919 at three AM., when a well-planned attack on a nearby
White ammunition base at Berdiansk resulted in the artillery depot's explosion. Taking
advantage of the ensuing chaos, the Makhnovists completely annihilated their pursuers
while escaping encirclement.
Having destroyed the Whites' ammun.ition, the Makhnovists proceeded to cut the
Southern Railway, thereby removing Denikin's entire supply line. Further dividing his
troops into parallel columns, Makhno pushed his forces to destroy Denikin's rear in the
southeast comer of Russia. They drove the White forces back hundreds of miles to the
Sea of Azov and then north to Ekateriooslav in less than three weeks.

224

The Whites, who had expected to take Moscow in December, were forced to
divert one and a haif of their best cavalry divisions against Makhno. Attacked and beaten
at the exact spot where their lines had been weakened, the Whites fell to the Red's
defensive onslaught. eventually pushing them to the shore of the Black Sea. Within three
4

weeks, the wealmesses caused by Makhno' s forces had converted Den.ikin' s march on
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Moscow into a full retreat. 225 Denikin himself acknowledged tbe significance of
Makhno's breakthrough. stating that it "had the effect of disorganizing our rear and
weakening the front at the most critical period." 226 In his numerous accounts of the
Makbnovist movement, Volin went even further -- asserting that "the honor of having
annihilated the Denikinist counter-revolution in the autumn of 1919 belongs entirely to
the Makhnovist Insurgent Army.,,227
The Makhnovist movement once again revitalized itself through its victory over
an adversary. The success of this campaign brought an influx of one thousand machine
guns and varying amounts of cannons, shells, motor lorries, and airplanes at an opportune
moment. With these supplies, Makhno was able to increase the size of his movement
even further - to forty thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalrymen. 228 An
enonnous area was again free for anarchist experimentation.

The Makhnovists' Urban Failure
Empowered and secure, Makhno again attempted to create an example of
anarchism for the world to see. Toward thjs aim the Makhnovists established no
bureaucratic authorities in captured urban areas, set up soviets, chased out owners, and
encouraged workers to set up co-ops. Populations were encouraged to initiate their own
forms of local self-government, and voluntary agreements were made between cities and
the surrounding countryside. The Makhnovists immediately founded a Russian and a
Ukrainian daily paper, and likewise allowed the Bolsheviks to print their Sta!, the Left
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Social Revolutionaries to publish The Standard ojRevolt, and the Right Social
Revolutionaries to circulate The People's Power. 229
The Makhnovist program ran into profound difficulties in these urban areas,
however. Foremost, the industrial workers resisted Makhno's encouragement to form
self-active trade unions. For example, when the railway workers of Aleksandrovsk came
to Makhno complaining that they had not been paid for weeks, Makhno encouraged them
to take control of the railroad and charge the passengers what they deemed to be a fair
price. In this situation, as in others, Makhno's ideas met with limited success. Urban
workers were interdependent components within urban industry. Without the guidance of_
technical experts, any experimentation would inevitably fail. Makhno's anarchist
dilemma in regards to these workers involved the means of compensation existing within
the cities. While the peasants and artisans of the countryside could barter the products of
their labor, urban workers depended on wages to survive. To provide for them within the
present system, Makhno would have had to give them something for nothing because
urban workers did not retain the products of their labor. Although the Bolsheviks were
willing to do this, by forcing the rural population to feed the cities, such a move would
have discredited Makhno with ills peasant supporters and betrayed Makhno's own propeasant sympathies. 23o
Because of this inherent urban economic tension, a proposal for shared BoishevikMakhnovist power in Alexandrovsk drew sharp repression from Makhno in late 1919.
The Bolshevik Revolutionary Committee of AJexandrovsk proposed that it run the city's
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civil administration, while Makhno would remain in charge of the city's defense.
Makhno refused to. share power. In fact, his actions proved how clearly he resented even
the suggestion of shared power: he shot a Makhnovist regimental commander who
favored the project, as well as all the Bolsheviks involved in the scheme. In this turbulent
climate, Makhno left both Ekaterinoslav and Alexandrovsk by December of 1919.
Voline's excuse that "the instability of the situation (had) prevented positive work" seems
valid. In the ongoing struggle for ideological and political hegemony between the
Bolsheviks and the Makhnovists, the Bolsheviks held a trump card in the cities because
they advocated the dictatorship of the proletariat. 231

December 1919: Trotsky's Failed Attempt to Remove Makhno

Through their separate efforts against the White Army, the Makhnovists and the
Reds had become indirect and rather unhappy allies. When they reached the south in
December 1919, the Red Anny acknowledged Makhno's importance in the struggle
against Denikin, but they quickly sought to remove their regional military and ideological
rival. Toward this aim, the Reds ordered the Makhnovists to the new Polish front. This
was a blatant attempt to open the Ukraine and to convert the Makhnovist soldiers into
regular Red Anny troopS.232 Understanding these motivations, Makhno refused this
request, replying that Trotsky wanted to replace Denikin's forces with the Red Anny and
the displaced landlords with political commissars. Having promised to cleanse Russia of
anarchism with "an iron broom" Trotsky again outlawed Makhno on JarlUaI'l' IS, 1920
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this time for "betraying the revolution," 233
The result was a war of attrition and carnage, during which the Makhnovists
fought superior Red forces for nine months, alternating between victory and defeat.

Ini tially Makhno had some success, principally because at times a good half of the
opposing Red Army soldiers favored MakhnO. 234 On one occasion, Makhno's forces
were even able to capture an entire Red Army Division which equaled the size of his
entire forces. The Reds' reasoning was simple; in contrast to the Bolsheviks, who did not
take prisoners and executed even ordinary soldiers, the Makhnovists executed only
officers and Communist Party militants, while allowing privates to go free or join their
movement. 235
Bolshevik aggression in the villages likewise increased Makhno's popular
support. Upon occupying Ukrainian villages, the Bolsheviks immediately shot all the
inhabitants who showed any overt sign of being sympathetic to Makhno. Moreover, any
village resisting Bolshevik grain requisitioning was labeled a "Bandit Village" and
suffered a similar fate. 236
These reactions produced the inevitable result. Makhno's forces enjoyed the full
sympathy of the local populatioD.

237

The Bolsheviks themselves acknowledged that the

entire province of Ekaterinoslav supported Makhno, This reality supported the guerrilla
warfare at which Makhno excelled; he was able to successfully engage the Red
Commander Budenyi's elite cavalry army, and even gunned down an additional four
hundred fifty cadets from Red Officers' schools. By profoundly undennining soviet
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power in the U1craine, Makhno retained the organiLation of the Revolutionary
Insurrection Army.238 Yet, because such acts made further joint Red-Makhnovist
cooperation impossible, the White forces, under the new leadership of General Peter
Nikolaevich Wrangel, again occupied the southeastern Ukraine. 239
Attempting to undermine Makbno's movement, the Bolsheviks repeated their
earlier accusations that Makhno had made an alliance with the Whites. Wrangel had, in
fact, sent officers to Makhno offering him complete territorial autonomy in exchange for
cooperation with the Whites. Makhno's response, however, was the same as before: be
immediately shot Wrangel's messengers. Makhno would not tolerate his movement's
incorporation with an ideology advocating the reestablishment of a cOWlterrevolutionary
bureaucratic state because such a situation opposed his ideals of revolutionary anarchism
and contradicted the desires oftbe peasantry.240

Amnesty and White General Wrangel's Defeat
Because of General Wrangel's advances into the Ukraine in mid October 1920,
the Red Army simultaneously sought the Makhnovist movement's military aid to
facilitate the Whites' defeat. In order to gain assistance and time, the Bolsheviks
promised the Makhnovists the release of all anarchist prisoners, complete freedom of
propagand~ and

full participation in Soviet bodies. Makhno accepted the proposal in late

October 1920. The Bolsheviks were apprehensive about publishing news about the
alliance, however, because it would reveal that they had previously lied about Makhno's
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alliance with General Wrangel. Makhno's persistent demands finally resulted in the
publication of the terms of the new alliance. The Bo Isheviks intentionally printed the
military clauses of the agreement before the political clauses. As the political clauses
admitted that Makbno had never allied with the Whites, the reason behind the order of
publication was simple; the Bolsheviks wanted to cushion the impact of their earlier
deception. 241 Such Bolshevik trickery increased Makhno's hesitancy, as did the
Bolsheviks' eventual denial of a clause in the treaty granting the establishment
Of free organs of political and economic
self government, their autonomous and federative connection,
based on aYreements with the government organs of the Soviet
Republics. 42
Yet, the hesitant Makhnovist-Bolshevik anti-Wrangel alliance continued and once
again Makhno's forces played a decisive role in pushing the Whites back. Within three
weeks, Makhno's forces cleared the opposing Whites from Ekaterinoslav province.
Augmenting the Red forces, they broke through the Whites' defensive positions on the
Perekop Isthmus. Wrangel's resistance was inadequate. His str.onghold at the Crimean
capital of Simeropol was taken on November 15, 1920, and the White Army ceased to
ex.ist. 243 Immediately upon bearing word of the victory, a Makbnovist aide was
overheard saying "It's the end of the agreement. I'll bet you anything the Bolsheviks will
be on us within a week.,,244 Even this pessimistic prediction would soon be proven
optimistic.
After this defeat of the one remaining White anny, the Bolsheviks turned on
Makhno, attempting to eradicate his movement. Their reason was not difficult to find:
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the vital Makhnovist movement would obviously resist further assimilation of the
Ukraine into the Bolshevik state. Makhno needed to be removed precisely because his
interpretation of Anarcho-Communism had proven its success.
November 26, 1920 was a day of infamous betrayal. The Reds invited the entire
Crimean Command of the Makhnovist Army to a conference. Upon their arrival, they
were shot and their troops disanned. In the malay, only one Makhnovist cavalry unit
escaped, returning to Makhno in Gulyai Polye eleven days later. OfMakbno's one
thousand six hundred horsemen elite before the conference, only two hundred fifty
escaped with their lives. Simultaneously, the Cheka swept across the Ukraine, arresti.ng
and executing all the known anarchists they could find. 245 A statement made by
Samsonov, the head of the Cheka, highlights the Bolsheviks' preventive killing approach
for both real and potential adversaries:
You consider this treachery? We knew how to use Makhno
when we needed him; and when he became useless to us, we
contrived to liquidate bim. 246
The Makhnovist movement was obliterated. Rakovskii, the head of the Bolshevik
government in the Ukraine, sought to perpetuate this situation by equating any and all
resistance to Bolshevik power with the recently defeated White counter-revolution.
1. All White Guards are declared to be outside the law. Anyone
who renders resistance to Soviet power will be shot on the spot.
2. Closest relatives of insurgents will be taken hostage and placed
in concentration camps...
3. Villages which rendered assistance to the insurgents by providing
horses, carts, and reinforcements are declared to be under martial
law and will be subjected to tbe following reprisals: (a) confiscation
of food supply stocks (b) monetary indemnity (c) confiscatioD of
property (d) bombardment of the village (e) [mal annihilation of the
24-1 Christopher Read, From Tsar to Soviets (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996),262-263.
w Nomad, 335-336., Woodcock, 423.
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village.
4. All chiefs of the rear and all officials of Soviet power in the localities
are to draft a list of villages which are the centers of counterrevolution
and to apply the measures listed above in regard to these villages. 247

The Bolsheviks were detennined to stamp out all signs of autonomy in the Ukrainian
countryside. The Bolshevik alliance agreements had been a mere cover for covert
military action against Makhno, anarchists, and all who opposed or might eventually
oppose the Bolsheviks. 248
Following their coup, the Bolsheviks accused Makhno of organizing a new
peasant army to fight the Soviet Government and of refusing to go to the Caucus front
when ordered to do so by supreme military command. Perhaps the most painful
accusation was that the Makhnovists had never really fought Wrangel in the Crimea.
Under Bolshevik reinterpretation, the Makhnovists were presented as traitors who had
only attacked the rear of the Red Army in the Crimea. 249 The fact that it was Makhno
and not the Red Army who was betrayed is, however, obvious. Following the Crimean
Conference, the Makhnovists captured two Red soldiers with leaflets entitled ''Forward
Against Makhno!" According to the soldiers' own accounts, these leaflets were given to
them on November 15 and 16 - the very day Makhno's troops helped defeat Wrangel's
stronghold at Sirnferopol. 250

Makhno's Nine Month Resistance
Following the coup, Makhno's surviving forces again benefited from popular
sentiment and support among rank-and-file Red troops. Encircled at Gulyai Polye by
4
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superior Red Army forces, Makhno broke through with a cavalry detachment of between
one hundred and fifty and two hundred men. The peasant components within the Red
Army faciliUlted Makhno's escape. In their eyes, Makhno was their own flesh and blood,

their own and only champion of their own rights. Although few Red Soldiers now
deserted to his weakened forces, on two occasions Makhno took as many Red prisoners
as be had men. 251 As a result, even after the crushing defeat of his army, Makhno
continued to win victories over his numerically superior foe.
Popular peasant sympathies also aided Makhno's nine-month resistance.
AJthough many ofMakhno's followers had died and his supplies were chronically low,
his name still drew independent guerrilla fighters. Bolshevik atrocities proved a
profound motivation for these irregulars. In Makhno's area of operation alone, two
thousand peasants were shot or mutilated by the Bolsheviks, while the same number were
forced to leave the region. The entire Ukrainian countryside, along with the Don and the
Kuban Cossack Hosts, rose up in armed rebellion against the Bolsheviks during the
winter of 1920 and the spring of 1921. Under these conditions, Makhno's forces quickly
grew to one thousand five hundred cavalrymen and one thousand

infantry.252

Confronted with a concentrated enemy fifty times stronger than his own forces,
Makhno's forces relied heavily upon sympathetic villagers for survival. A typical
detachment of three hundred or four hundred core Makhnovist forces depended upon a
dozen or so villages for food supplies and temporary infusions of fighters for large
operations. As long as Makhno maintained his popular support among the peasantry, the
Makhnovist military government would remain a vital rival to Bolshevik authority in the
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Ukraine. 253
The Bolsheviks acknowledged this reality in their 1920 fifth All-Ukrainian Party
Conference:
It is hard to disti.nguish between the kulak and the poor peasant
in the Makhno movement. It is a mass peasant movement. We
do not have anything in the countryside, anything we can hold onto,
anybody who can be our ally in the struggle with the bandits. 254

Attempting to remedy this situation, the Bolsheviks sought to undermine the
Makhnovists' peasant support. Accepting the failure of soviet collective fauns in the
Ukraine, the Bolsheviks distributed these lands amongst the peasantry. The continued
failure of Bolshevik agrarian policy, however, continued to foment peasant discontent.
Grain requisitions continued through the spring of 1921, when the New Economic Policy
was announced. The seized grain would often rot at the railroad stations through
inefficiency, lack of fuel, railroad breakdowns, or sabotage. 255 These events only served
to further enrage the peasantry.
As they had over all the other territories that they controlled, the Bolsheviks tried

to bring the class war to the Ukrainian villages in order to divide Makhno's support. To
create an auxiliary peasant force to assist in Bolshevik grain requisitions, the communists
rapidly organized "Committees of the Poor." Because the Bolsheviks gave these poor
and landless peasants a share of the grain seized from the more prosperous peasants, the
necessities of sUlvival did, to some extent, facilitate "class conflict." Mindful of where
their bread came from, the landless peasants became reliable Bolshevik secret police
informants, often hunting down and executing wounded Makhnovist soldiers. Makhno
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was thrown into an awkward situation. Although he desired support from a united
peasantry, he was forced to maintain the economic inequalities of the status quo. The
landed peasantry refused to counter the Bolsheviks' food bribes by sharing some of their
grain with the landless peasants. Makhno's support was undennined and divided. 256

The New Economic Policy and Exile
The deathblow for the Makhnovists occurred in March 1921, when Lenin adopted
the New Economic Policy, thereby ending the forced and often excessive requisition of
foodstuffs, as well as other unpopular policies. Under NEP, Lenin substituted a Single
Agricultural Tax for the hated requisitions, thereby removing the peasantry's main
grievance against the Bolsheviks. The source of their discontent removed, the Ukrainian
peasantry ceased to supply material and manpower for Makhno' s struggle against the
Soviet government. 257
The ideological understandings of Makhno's peasant partisans had never been
very strong. If they could gain what they desired within an alternative ideology or
societal structure, they were more than willing to adjust their orientation. The point of
contention in the Makhnovist-Bolshevik struggle had gradually become which group of
militant revolutionaries would achieve supreme authority in a collectivist society -
declasse intellectuals and ex-workers, or former peasants and irregular soldiers. As the
Communists modified their agrarian policies and the Makhnovists' principles remained a
distant possibility, the typical peasant--who was not really an "anarchist" in principle-~
had to choose between supporting an empowered Lenin or a virtually defeated Makhno.
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Precisely because be created a rival 'anarchist' regional movement while under the
popular libertarian auspices of anarchy, Nestor Ivanovich Makhno's removal was
necessary for the Bolshevik assimilation of the Ukraine. Anarchist depression at this new
turn of events was perhaps best expressed by Alexander Berkman on the eve ofms

March 1921 departure from Russia.
Gray are the passing days. One by one the embers of hope have
died out. Terror and despotism have crushed the life born in
October. The slogans of the Revolution are foresworn (sic), its
ideals stifled in the blood of the people. The breath of yesterday
is dooming millions to death; the shadow of today hangs like a
black pall over the country. Dictatorship is trampling the masses
underfoot. The Revolution is dead; its spirit cries in the wilderness....
r have decided to leave Russia. 258
In many ways, his expressive eulogy was appropriate. Kropotkin, the

elder spokesperson of Anarcho-Communism had died in February. Meanwhile, hundreds
of anarchists languished in Bolshevik.prisons and peasant soviets fonnerly supported by
Makhno now became instruments of the Bolshevik party's dictatorship.259
Although Makhno never surrendered, he realized his movement was finished.
The motivations behind the Ukraine peasantry's support had eroded and he stood
virtually alone. His August 28, 1921 flight across the Dniester River and into Rumania's
relative freedom was unavoidable. With his lucky escape, anarchy as a vital force ceased
to exist in the Ukraine. The path was clear for tbe ascendancy of the Bolshevik State.

In exile in Paris, Makhno was a miserably lonely peasant and consumptive

alcoholic. This depression and misery was only exasperated by both the weakness of the
French Anarchist movement and the international anarchist communities argument over
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the 'Platform.' Between 1919 and 1920, many of the anarchists within the CGT (General
Confederation of Labour) changed alliances and went over to the Communist Party. It
only infuriated Makhno further that the CGT daily paper, L' Humanite' had been taken
over, changed into Le Libertaire, and published weekly instead of daily.26o
Makhno's greatest sadness, however, came from the quarrels over and eventual
failure of the "Platform." Originally published in Delo Truda by Peter Arshinov, the
"Platform" proposed a general union of anarchists with a central executive committee for
action. Citing that anarchists' experiences with the Bolsheviks had proven the faults of
uncoordinated anarchist action, Makhno became the only prominent anarchist to support
Arshinov. Volin, in 1927, was among the first group of anarchists to reject the idea of an
anarchist "Platform," arguing that the desire to establish a central committee too closely
paralleled the Bolshevik state structure. As Arshinov had been a Bolshevik before he
joined the anarchists, this attack carried much sway amongst the international
community.261
Makhno and Arsmnov attacked Volin and his supporters in response,
downplaying their roles in the Makhnovist [nsurrection Army. This left a bad taste in the
mouths of most Russian anarchists, and the "Platform" was solidly defeated in the spring
of 1930 at the lOth Congress of the Union of Revolutionary Anarchist-Communists.
Although Makhno had already lost most of his friends, the fallollt from the "Platform"
was complete in 1932, when Arshinov rejoined the Bolshevik Party and reentered the
Soviet Union in 1934. Makhno looked like a fool and subsequent publications by
Arshinov, such as his 1933 pampWet Anarchism and the Dictatorship ofthe Proletariat,
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disillusioned and hurt Makhno immensely.262
When Makhno died in Paris on July 25, 1934 the press of the Soviet Union did
not print one word about his death. Perhaps the Soviet Union's fear of Makhno, even in
death, revolved around its continuing concern over the example Makhno had established
through his rival 'anarchist' government coupled with stubborn peasant guerrilla
resistance. 263 Five hundred Russian, French, Spanish and Italian anarchists attended his
funeral at Pere Lachaise cemetery. Even the semi-official paper of the French Foreign
Service recorded a poignant remark on Makhno's death:
It is certain that Denikin's defeat owed more to the peasant
insurrection under the black Makhnovist banner than to the
successes ofTrotski's [sic] regular army. The Makhnovist
bands tipped the scales in favour oftbe Reds, and, if Moscow
may now want to forget the fact, impartial history will remember it. 264
As an anarchist expatriot living in Paris, Makhno remained firmly bound to his
convictions. He lived his life as a personal anarchist example. He regularly attended
anarchist meetings at the Parisian Jewish Autodidact Club, and intermingled with
anarchists the world over -- including Durruti and Ascaso from Spain, to whom he
offered his assistance, should the day of their anarchist revolution arrive in his lifetime.
The Spanish anarchists provided Makhno with financial assistance when he lay dying in
bed of tuberculosis. Although Makhno died before he could follow through on this
promise, several veterans of his Insurgent Army did join and fight with the Durruti
column in 1936. Crippled and confined to his bed for most of the last year of his life,
Makhno bad continued to dream until his dyi.ng day of returning to his beloved native
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land and "taking up again the struggle for liberty and social justice.',265

Conclusion
This study has shown that Nestor Ivanovich Makhno strove to implement an
interpretation of anarchism that consciously catered itself to the peasantry's desires. The
resulting governmental organization, military structure and arbitrary tendencies of his
movement profoundly conflicted ideals of theoretically pure anarchy. These
manifestations were, however, in full accord with the peasantry's conception of the
valiant revolt leader, which was best exemplified by peasantry's collective memory of the
rebel leaders Stenka Razin and Emelian Pugachev.
As a utopian revolutionist, Makhno was forced to surmount the difficulties of
implementing anarchist theories in an "impure" human environment by modifying them
within a temporary manifestation which was not anarchistic. Yet, these compromises did

not worry Makhno's peasant supporters precisely because they saw anarchism merely as
a path to the alleviation of a plethora of grievances that had been visited upon them for
centuries. Although the Makhnovists honestly desired to achieve a theoretically pure
anarchy in the future, the Ukrainian peasantry supported Makhno's movement in the
hope of obtaining immediate economic and political emancipation. The peasantry's
traditional desire [or land and autonomy drew them to Makhno's anarchism because he
protected their interests, left a great deal of autonomy in their hands, and produced the
results that they desired. Like Makhno himself, the Ukrainian peasantry interested itself
with action and success - not hairsplitting over theoretical or ideological qualms.
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The Ukrainian peasantry consistently supported Makhno's rebel movement
because they appreciated the gains that his interpretation of anarchism brought them. The
Gulyai Polye peasantry especially accepted the thoughts of Michael Bakunin and Peter
Kropotkin, whose thoughts also influenced the Makhnovists immensely. This symbiotic
relationship between persistent peasant aspirations, charismatic guidance, and
revolutionary Anarcho-Communist thought allowed the "Black" Makhnovist forces to
carry out an anarchist experiment over a significant amount of territory for an extended
period of time.
Because Makhno's Black forces effectively hindered and threatened Bolshevik
ascendancy in the Ukraine, the peasantry's assimilation into the new state could only
occur after support for Makhno had been undermined through the New Economic Plan
and the example of his erstwhile anarchistic community had been eliminated. The
Makhnovist movement worried the Bolsheviks precisely because it had effectively
combined the peasantry's traditional aspirations, a widely accepted charismatic leader,
and an adaptive interpretation of revolutionary Anarcho-Cornmunism.
The Makhnovist movement thus bears testimony to the vitality and advantages
offered peasant rebel groups to this day. Throughout his leadership of an anarchist
movement, Makhno proved the success and desirability of orienting a pre-anarchist
society towards an anarchistically impure temporary manifestation to facilitate anarchism
in the future. In this way, Makhno was an anarchist and an anarch, although he carried
out actions for the moment that fundamentally departed from anarchy. To judge for sure
whether his movement was anarchistically pure or Dot, one would have to see the end
result of his temporary departures from pure anarchy. We were never able to see his end

Young 98

result, however, precisely because his combination of anarchism, autonomy, and peasant
land desires proved so powerful and successful. The Reds had to eliminate Makhno and
crush his message or they might have met with greater resistance and possible defeat in
their efforts to dominate the lush Ukraine.
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